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SLAYING THE TROLL: LITIGATION AS AN




Litigation has traditionally been seen as a disfavored option for
an accused infringer. Instead, litigation is commonly viewed as an
activity that is forced on an unwilling market participant. This article
proposes that the threat of litigation is a double-edged sword that
affects not just the decision making process of the infringer, but also
that of the patentee. The threat of litigation is particularly important
when the patentee is a patent troll, counterbalancing the patent troll's
ability to force a license and playing a key role in forcing low- or
zero-cost settlements. This article first explores the options available
to the accused infringer in the face of a patent threat, and defines the
concept of a patent troll. It then examines the reasons why an
infringer might choose to litigate, and describes a model through
which to view the infringer and patentee's decisions. This model is
then used to examine how changes in the ability ofpatentees to obtain
injunctions may drive the tendency of parties to litigate and the value
of settlements that occur in place of litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Picture yourself as the president of a company that makes
widgets. Let's call that company Widgeto. Widgeto began making
and selling widgets several years ago, and makes a modest profit.
Today, however, you received a letter from another company named
Trowe Investments, claiming that Widgeto's widgets infringed upon a
patent held by Trowe, and asking Widgeto to pay Trowe five dollars
for every widget that Widgeto has ever made, and five dollars each
time it makes a widget in the future. You've never heard of Trowe
before; they are not one of your competitors, and you don't believe
that they have any connection to the widget market. What do you do?
In such a situation, a market participant's options are limited: it
can attempt to negotiate with the patent holder, participate in the
market at risk, avoid the market, or litigate. Each option has
associated costs. For instance, choosing to participate in the market
comes with the risk of being sued for damages - or even enjoined -
while avoiding the market entirely results in forgoing significant
opportunity costs. Negotiating generally involves the payment of a
royalty or other compensation to the patentee. The final option,
litigation, has typically been regarded as the province of the patent
holder, rather than the infringer, since litigation is the enforcement
mechanism by which a patentee can extract revenue from an infringer.
An infringer's options are even more limited when the threat
comes from a patent troll. Patent trolls - entities who neither develop
new technologies nor participate directly in the market, but instead
acquire patent rights solely for the purpose of obtaining a revenue
stream - have become a major threat to market participants. By its
very nature, a patent troll has the ability to assert a patent against an
established market participant while avoiding any serious risk to
itself.1 Yet, a patent troll is rarely interested in litigating for the sake
of litigating - rather, it seeks to use its patent to obtain a revenue
stream in the form of licensing payments.2 Thus, a patent troll will
commonly offer an accused infringer some price at which it is willing
to make the threat of litigation vanish .
1. As discussed more fully in section III, because a patent troll's only assets are its
patents, a troll rarely runs the risk of being countersued by a competitor.
2. See Jeremiah Chan and Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL.
PROP. L. BULL. 1, 3 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative patent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 953-54 (2004).
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When the patent threat comes from such an entity, it would seem
that litigation places all power in the hands of the patent troll.
Professors Farrell and Merges, for example, have described
challenger-patentee litigation as containing a slew of misbalanced
incentives, both against challenging the patent in the first place, and
in favor of the patentee during the litigation itself.4 This suggests that
litigation is a weapon that resides primarily in the hands of the
patentee, and can be used to force a settlement price that the infringer
must accept.5 The discounted value of an infringer's willingness to
challenge a patent has prompted numerous calls for non-litigation
solutions for improving patent quality, such as post-grant reviews and
modified property regimes for patent ownership.
6
Looking beyond the potential settlement price that the infringer
cannot refuse, however, reveals a number of benefits that the infringer
can obtain if it litigates - benefits that are augmented when the
patentee is a troll. For instance, an infringer may be able to fix the
claim scope in such a way that it becomes easier to design around the
patentee's patent, thus eliminating the possibility of future royalties.
Tactical benefits may also flow from initiating litigation against the
patentee. At the same time, there are costs to the infringer of not
litigating - most notably, the fact that other patent trolls may take the
infringer's wish to license the patent as an invitation to feast.
Nor are the reasons for litigating limited to the effects of the
litigation on the infringer. Litigation also has negative effects on the
patentee. One such effect is the cost of the litigation itself, something
that may drive down the patent troll's settlement price. More
importantly, however, is the fact that through litigation, an infringer
places the patent troll's most important asset - its patent - at risk.
Professors Farrell and Merges have demonstrated that the possibility
of losing its patent greatly incentivizes a patentee to win litigation.7
4. Id. at 968.
5. See id. at 952-60.
6. The most common proposal for improving patent quality is the creation of some form
of post-grant review. There are numerous examples of such systems. See, e.g., Farrell and
Merges, supra note 3, at 964-68; Qin Shi, Reexamination, Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative
Efforts to Create a Post-Grant Patent Quality Control System, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 433, 451-62
(2003); David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant
Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 9, 19-41 (2005). An alternative proposal for addressing
the problem of patent trolls is the creation of a "patent investment trust," modeled on the
concept of a Real Estate Investment Trust ("REIT"). See Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment
Trusts: Let's Build a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 383-87 (2005)
[hereinafter Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts].
7. See Farrell and Merges, supra note 3, at 952.
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This is especially true when the patentee is a troll, whose only asset is
its patent. By litigating, an infringer places this value at issue, forcing
it to affect the troll's settlement price.
These factors demonstrate that litigation can be a powerful tool
in the hand of an infringer, who can use that threat to force a lower (or
zero) value settlement price. These effects can be further seen by
reference to a settlement model. Such a model provides a deeper
understanding of when the threat of litigation can drive the settlement
price down, and when an infringer will litigate against a patent troll.
In its simplest form, the model establishes that the infringer and troll's
settlement prices are dependant on separate factors, and can move
independently; that there are reasons why a patentee would not want
to litigate against a small infringer; and that when the consequences
of not litigating are taken into account, settlement may become
unlikely or impossible.
This article first sets forth four options available to an infringer
when faced with a patent threat. It then defines the concept of a
"patent troll," as distinguished from innovators and producers. Given
this understanding of patent trolls, I offer a number of reasons why
litigation may be beneficial to the infringer. I next describe a model to
evaluate how these factors can affect the amount and likelihood of
settlement versus litigation when threatened by a patent troll, and
illustrate how changes in the ability of patent trolls to obtain
injunctions may affect these outcomes.
II. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THREATENED INFRINGERS
When faced with a patent threat, a firm has four options: bear the
risk of enforcement litigation, negotiate, avoid the market, or litigate. 8
Each carries its own advantages and disadvantages. One possibility is
to simply bear the risk of the patent threat and enter - or remain in -
the market, despite the existence of a patent threat. Often times, the
firm views the patent threat as not credible, or unlikely. In the context
of a patent held by a competitor, both firms may hold patents that
arguably cover each other's products. 9 In that case it is frequently to
8. I use the term "patentee" to refer to the entity that can assert rights under a patent. In
many cases, this is the party to whom the patent has been formally assigned. Thus, the patentee
does not need to be the inventor, and in many cases the patentee is, in fact, a completely separate
entity. In contrast, the term "infringer" refers to any threatened firm - whether it actually
infringes the patentee's patent is irrelevant to this analysis. All that needs to exist is the potential
to be found to infringe the patent.
9. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1505-05 (2001).
[Vol. 23
COUNTERING PATENT THREATS USING "LITIGATION
neither party's advantage to assert its patents against the other.
Instead, a standstill exists, where both parties participate in the market
as if neither held patents. 0
A second course of action for the potential infringer is to
negotiate. Typically, negotiation results in the infringer obtaining a
license that requires the payment of a flat fee, royalties, or both to the
patentee. Regardless of the form, some type of monetary payment is
generally made from the infringer to the patentee."
Alternatively, an infringer may choose to avoid the market
entirely, thus sidestepping the patent threat. This decision, however,
comes with the opportunity cost of not participating in the market. In
addition, a firm's ability to refuse to participate can be limited
depending on how invested in the market the infringer is already. And
an infringer may still be liable for damages if it has operated under
the shadow of the patent for any period of time.'2
The fourth option, litigation, traditionally has been viewed as the
province of the patent holder. In many cases, the mere threat of
litigation may allow the patent holder to achieve its goal - especially
when that goal is to force a license of its patent. Moreover, the
patentee, rather than the infringer, generally initiates litigation.13
III. WHAT IS A PATENT TROLL?
According to popular understanding, the term "patent troll" was
coined in the late 1990s by Peter Detkin, the assistant general counsel
for Intel, to describe "somebody who tries to make a lot of money off
a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of
practicing and in most cases never practiced."' 14 Detkin's definition,
however, is unsatisfying; it does not, for example, exclude inventors
10. Professor Lemley describes this scenario as a "patent arms race." Id. at 1505.
11. See id. at 1505-06.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("Upon finding for the claimant, the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.").
13. This can be demonstrated by looking at what percentage of patent actions are brought
by the accused infringer. In one sample, for example, only 168 out of 1,209 tried cases were
declaratory judgment actions brought by the infringer. The remaining 86% were presumably
brought by the patentee. See Kimberly Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 921 (2001).
14. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts, supra note 6, at 367; See also "Patent troll,"
available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patenttroll; Brenda Sandburg, Inventor's Lawyer
Makes a Pile from Patents, The Recorder, July 30, 2001, LEXIS Nexis Library, RECRDR File.
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who develop new technologies but due to limited resources or various
business reasons, do not practice their patent.
15
Since the term was coined, various commentators have sought to
pin down a meaning. Following the spirit of Detkin's original
definition, some have attempted to define patent trolls by their
behavior towards actual market participants, noting that patent trolls
"obtain patents, not to make, use, or sell new products and
technologies, but solely to force third parties to purchase licenses.,
16
-Others have characterized patent trolls as "speculators" who "engage
in what is more accurately termed opportunistic licensing."' 7 In most
cases, however, the derisive tone of Detkin's original definition has
been maintained; calling a company a "patent troll" is frequently seen
as an insult, and can actually be excluded from litigation. 18
Despite the difficulty of defining exactly what a patent troll is, it
appears clear from contemporary definitions that a patent troll is an
entity that neither develops novel technologies nor uses those
technologies to provide goods or services to the market. Rather, a
patent troll acquires patents for the sole purpose of using them to
obtain a revenue stream from a firm that engages in activities
arguably falling within the scope of the patent. Typically, the troll
will acquire the patent at a relatively low cost from an innovator,
although some trolls may obtain their patents in-house.19 In this way,
a patent troll acts as a speculator, paying for patent rights based on the
hope that, in the future, it will be able to use the patent to obtain a
higher reward.
At the most basic level, patentees can be divided into three
categories: innovators, producers, and rent seekers. These three
categories are not mutually exclusive; a firm can exhibit one, two, or
even all three behaviors. Innovators are entities that create new
technologies and obtain patents on them. They may be individual
15. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
16. See e.g., Jeremiah Chan and Mathew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 1 (Fall 2005).
17. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts, supra note 6, at 375.
18. See Rambus Inc.'s Motion In Limine No. 1 to Preclude Use of Derogatory
Characterizations of Patents and Patentholders, Hyundai Electronics, et al v. Rambus, Inc., No.
CV 00-20905 RMW (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006) (moving to exclude the use of the term "patent
troll" as unduly prejudicial).
19. For instance, MercExchange, an entity sometimes described as a patent troll,
developed its patents internally, obtaining the first in the late 1990's. See Ellen McCarthy,
Waiting Out A Patent Fight With EBay, Washington Post, Jan. 6, 2005, at E01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51969-2005Jan5.html.
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inventors, universities, or companies. Producers 20 are firms that
practice a patent in the market covered by their patent. Typically, they
acquire patents for one of two reasons: to assert them against
competitors, thereby gaining a competitive advantage, or to defend
against a patent suit brought against a competitor.
The third category, rent seekers, consists of entities that utilize
the patent to obtain licensing revenue. This category encompasses,
but is not limited to, what are typically described as "patent trolls,"
"non-practicing entities," or "patent enforcement and holding
companies." Commentators have described these entities in a number
of ways, primarily focusing on their behavioral patterns. For instance,
Professor Landers has referred to them as "Companies that do not
produce products, but simply acquire patents to obtain licensing
revenue."2 1  Such companies "are compared to "terrorists that
"threaten legitimate innovators and producers" and are cited as
examples of a "disturbing trend., 22 One primary behavioral attribute
of a patent troll is its ultimate goal of licensing its patent. A patent
troll thus "purchas[es] a patent for the sole purpose of receiving
licensing fees."
2 3
Of course, not every acquirer-enforcer is a patent troll, nor is
every patent rent-seeker engaging in trolling.24 The non-patent related
behavior of the patent holder plays a critical role in assessing whether
it is a troll. Typically, to be a patent troll a firm must have no intent to
actually practice the patent. Thus patent trolls have been described as
"individuals or companies that buy up patents and assert them with no
intent ever to create a product," 25 obtaining patents "not to make, use,
or sell new products and technologies, but solely to force third parties
to purchase licenses. 26
At the same time, patent trolls are not merely acquirer-enforcers.
Another characteristic of patent trolls is their acquisition and
20. The term "producer" to refer to entities that actually practice the patent, regardless of
whether they manufacture a product. Another commonly used term is "practicing entity."
21. Amy Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of
Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 345 (2006).
22. Id.
23. Barker, supra note 6, at 2.
24. Id. at 16 ("The cotton gin and other similar examples show why there should be no
blanket rule that one person cannot acquire and enforce another's patent. Not every patent
acquirer who enforces a patent is a patent troll.").
25. Katherine E. White, Preserving the Patent Process to Incentivize Innovation in
Global Economy, 2006 SYRACUSE SC. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 1 (2006).
26. Chan and Fawcett, supra note 2, at 1.
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enforcement of older patents on newer products.27 This behavior is
termed "opportunistic licensing," in which patent trolls acquire older
patents, which they aggressively enforce when another party develops
a product arguably covered by the patent.28 This "troll like" behavior
can be compared to the classic tale of the billy goats gruff, where the
patentee waits beneath the bridge to spring up onto the unsuspecting
infringer.
29
Finally, a patent troll makes heavy use of the threat of litigation
- and the threat of an injunction - to force a license of its patent.30 In
order to make that threat a viable one, patent trolls often do, in fact,
engage in litigation to enforce their patent.3' Without the ability to
enforce their patent, a patent troll simply has an expensive piece of
paper.
It is important to distinguish patent trolling from enforcing "bad"
or poor quality patents. This is a common point of confusion. 32 "Bad"
27. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts, supra note 6, at 375-76 (stating that patent trolls
tend to buy older patents which may have been forgotten or overlooked, and then enforce those
patents against makers of relatively new technology).
28. Id. Patent trolls "wait for the industry to utilize a patented technology and then
enforce their patents on the alleged infringers." Chan and Fawcett, supra note 2, at 1; see also
Barker, supra note 6, at 7. Barker states that:
There are two types of patent trolls: individuals and corporations. An individual
patent troll is a patent holder who receives a patent and then secretly waits for
another inventor to develop the same technology. When this happens, the troll
appears and demands licensing fees for the use of the patented technology....
Similarly, corporate patent trolls purchase patents and do not enforce them until
the relevant industry has grown up around the patent.
Barker, supra note 6, at 7.
29. Robert Merges et. al., Brief ofAmicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 999, 1002 (2006).
30. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts, supra note 6, at 375-76. ("most patent trolls have no
plans to practice the patent - they make all their money from licensing, often under threat of
litigation.").
31. Two examples of such firms are NTP and MereExchange, both commonly described
as "patent trolls." These two firms have engaged in high profile patent litigation to enforce their
patents. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, (Fed. Cir. 2004); MercExchange,
L.L.C., v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also, Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts,
supra note 6, at 376. (noting that patent trolls are criticized on the grounds that they "clog up the
legal system with baseless litigation and bankrupt the manufacturers of technology by
demanding unfairly high licensing fees.").
32. See Barker, supra note 6, at 8. Barker states that the National Research Council of the
National Academies has found that the are four primary effects patent trolls have on innovation
and competition are:
(1) In contrast to incentives to genuine innovation, patents on trivial innovations
may confer market power or allow firms to use legal resources aggressively as a
competitive weapon without consumer benefit. (2) Poor patents could encourage
more charges of infringement and litigation, raising transaction costs. (3) The
2006] COUNTERING PATENT THREATS USING LITIGATION
patents are a commonly recognized problem, and there is significant
evidence that such patents deter innovation.33 However, patent trolls
do not necessarily acquire only bad patents; indeed, if patent trolls
only held low quality patents, they would be difficult to enforce in
actual litigation. This is not the case. There are numerous instances
where companies who fall within the category of "patent trolls"
prevailed in court and on appeal.34 Moreover, patent trolls often
acquire patents from third parties, rather than filing for the patents
themselves. 35 To the extent poor patents are being issued, the problem
is not directly related to patent trolls themselves; rather, the problem
lies with the party actually filing for the patent.36 Thus, the concept of
"bad" patents and that of patent trolls should be kept separate. While
patent trolls may tend to use overlooked or older patents, it is a stretch
to say that they are driving the creation of bad patents, or that "patent
trolling" is equivalent to enforcing bad patents.37
Patent trolls must also be distinguished from the other two
categories of patentees, which are typically seen as desirable:
innovators and producers.38 As is commonly recognized, patent trolls
are not producers who acquire patents as part of a defensive or
proliferation of low-quality patents in a technology complicates and raises the
cost of licensing or avoiding infringement. (4) The uncertainty about the validity
of previously issued patents may deter investment in innovation and/or distort its
direction.
Id. But National Research Council's report actually states that these effects relate to the quality
of the patents themselves, rather than to patent trolls. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.) (2004), available at
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf
33. See, e.g., Farrell and Merges, supra note 3, at 946 (noting that "an improper patent is
typically an unwarranted burden on consumers and other innovation).
34. See, e.g, MercExchange, 401 F.3d 1323 (holding MercExchange's patents valid and
infringed); NTP, 392 F.3d 1336 (affirming the district court's finding of infringement with
respect to some claims, and reversing with respect to others).
35. See Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts, supra note 6, at 376 ("First, patent trolls tend to
buy older patents, which may have been forgotten or overlooked.").
36. Of course, the well-publicized financial success of patent trolling may drive more
people to file lower quality patents in the future. However, given that patent trolling is a fairly
recent phenomenon, and given that the problem of low quality patents is not a recent one, it
would appear that the problem of low quality patents is one that exists irregardless of the
presence of patent trolls.
37. In addition, while patent trolls may not be directly driving the creation of low quality
patents, they may result in a greater enforcement of such patents, thus giving the appearance of
more low quality patents.
38. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.. 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006) (discussing self-
made inventors and university researchers as patent holders that that "might reasonably prefer to
license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring their
works to market themselves.").
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offensive strategy related to their own product line. 39 They are entities
that acquire patents covering a market in which they do not
participate. Consequently, unlike a producer, a patent troll has no
product that can be targeted by a counter-patent suit, thus enabling it
to assert its patents without obvious repercussions. Of course, a
producer need not actually practice the patent; rather the critical
question is whether it is enforcing its patent in a market in which it
participates. For instance, a patentee might manufacture a product that
can either use a widget or a gadget. The patentee has patents on both
widgets and gadgets. However, the patentee decides to use only
widgets in its product. While the patentee does not practice the gadget
patent, it is not a patent troll. Indeed, even if the patentee chooses to
license its gadget patent to competitors, the fact that the patent relates
to a market that it participates in characterizes it as a producer, rather
than a patent troll.4°
Differentiating between an innovator and a patent troll is more
difficult. A patent troll cannot be distinguished on the ground that it
simply acquires patents from other entities, since not all patent trolls
follow this strategy.4' Indeed, some patent trolls develop their own
patents internally.42 Thus, what distinguishes a patent troll from an
innovator is not its method of acquiring patents, but rather the
relationship between its patent and the underlying technology. The
goal of a patent troll is simply to obtain a patent that it can use to
extract licensing revenues. It is not to develop a new technology that
can be used by a producer. In other words, the subject matter of a
patent troll's patent does not need to have any value independent of
the property rights granted by the patent. In contrast, an innovator
seeks not just to obtain a patent, but also to create an underlying
technology that has some value.
39. See, e.g., Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts, supra note 6, at 375.
40. Note that when pre-suit infringement is at issue, a patent troll has a substantial
advantage over a producer that is suing to enforce its patent, since in order to recover damages
for past infringement, a producer must mark its products with its patent number. See 35 U.S.C. §
287(a) (2000). In contrast, a non-practicing patent holder does not need to have marked any
products in order to collect damages for past infringement. See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v.
Enterprise Ry. Equipment Co., 297 U.S. 387, 395 (1936) (holding that section 287 does not
apply to situations where there are no products to be marked); see also Texas Digital Systems,
Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reaffirming the conclusion set
forth in Wine Ry).
41. One example is that of MercExchange, which developed its own patents internally
rather than acquiring them from an outside source. See McCarthy, supra note 19.
42. Id.
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This point can be demonstrated by analogizing the patent to a
piece of land. Both the innovator and the patent troll can potentially
own the land, thus having the right to exclude others from it. The
innovator, however, uses the land to raise a crop. The crop has a value
that is independent of the existence of ownership rights in the land.
Indeed, even if no property rights system existed, the innovator would
still have value while the patent troll would have nothing. 43 The
patent troll's land may have some value independent of the right to
exclude (it may even have a valuable crop); however, that value is
irrelevant to the patent troll's goal of extracting value through its right
to exclude.
Of course, it can be difficult to evaluate whether a given entity
has created technological value independent of the patent rights. As
noted at the outset, a single firm can engage in behavior that falls
within all three categories: innovation, production, or speculation.
However, the fact that a firm produces a product, or engages in
innovation, cannot be taken as proof that the firm is not a patent troll.
Any firm that acquires patents in an area in which it neither
participates in the market nor develops new technologies can
potentially be described as engaging in "trolling." Indeed, even
though a firm may have exposure to patent counterattacks in one
market does not prevent that firm from engaging as an unfettered
patent troll in another, because the firms against whom it is asserting
its patents will not necessarily have patents to use against the
patentee's own products. That said, the most dangerous type of patent
troll is a troll without any product line at all - in other words, a firm
against whom it is impossible to assert patents as a defense. As
discussed in the next section, however, despite the inability to
counter-sue on an alleged infringer's own patents, it can actually be to
the threatened infringer's advantage to litigate against the patent troll.
IV. WHY WOULD INFRINGERS WANT TO LITIGATE
AGAINST PATENT TROLLS?
Section II set forth four options available to a market participant
when faced with a patent threat: negotiate, leave the market,
participate in the market at risk, or litigate. Because of the way a
patent troll acts, by enforcing patents against developed markets,
choosing not to participate in the market is rarely a viable option. A
firm will typically already have substantial sunk costs, and the
43. Obviously, this assumes that no one can simply steal the innovator's crop.
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patentee will also be seeking damages for past activity. Likewise,
since a patent troll's goal is to extract revenue from the infringer, it is
unlikely that it would take no action if the infringer were to remain in
the market at risk. This is in contrast with a patent held by a
practicing entity that may choose not to assert the patent for a variety
of reasons.4 This leaves two options: negotiate or litigate. When
faced with this quandary, initiating litigation may be the optimal
strategy, both because of certain advantages that an accused infringer
can gain via litigation, as well as the economic benefits of this
strategy. Many of these benefits have special weight when the
patentee is a troll.
At first glance, there appears to be no reason why a threatened
infringer would want to initiate litigation against a patent troll. If the
infringer is successful, its competitors will capture a majority of the
value of the infringer's success. For instance, if an infringer succeeds
in having a patent held invalid, that patent will be invalid with respect
to all other potential infringers - even if it did not participate in the
litigation.45 Thus, although the firm will pay the costs of the litigation,
it will only reap a fraction of the benefit. This appears to create a first
mover problem - if you can reap the benefits without incurring any of
the costs, why initiate litigation?
However, a closer examination reveals a number of reasons why
an infringer may choose to litigate. For instance, a first mover may be
able to derive substantial advantages from litigating early, such as
claim fixing, which may not be available to it if it delays. In addition,
while a successful infringer may be limited to only the value it can
extract from the market in the absence of the patent, rather than the
full value of the patent itself, by holding the patentee's patent hostage
via invalidity arguments, an accused infringer may be able to capture
more than the value that would be available to it via a simple victory.
These factors are amplified when the patentee is a patent troll.
Many of the benefits that can be obtained by the accused infringer if it
initiates litigation, such as claim fixing, may have greater weight in
the context of a patent troll. Moreover, because the patent troll's
primary asset - the patent - is the very thing being litigated, an
accused infringer may be able to obtain more value from the patentee
44. Such reasons include the existence of a patent "arms race" described by Professor
Lemley. See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1504.
45. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)
(holding that a patentee is estopped from asserting that a patent is valid if there was a prior
determination of patent invalidity unless the patentee demonstrates that it was denied a full and
fair opportunity to litigate in the first action).
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than it would be able to obtain by negotiating a license or remaining
in the market at risk.
A. The Benefits ofLitigating
While much of the focus of patent litigation is on whether the
patentee will be able to extract some form of revenue out of the
accused infringer, there are a number of collateral benefits that the
infringer may be able to derive from litigation. For example, through
litigation an infringer may be able to establish a more definite claim
scope that would make design-around attempts easier. An infringer
may also be able to gain more information about its opponent's
position, thus improving its attempts to determine a beneficial
settlement price. And in the event that an infringer is able to initiate
litigation, it can gain tactical benefits from being able to choose the
forum. Each of these factors may provide an infringer with a reason to
choose to litigate.
1. Fixing Claim Scope
One benefit of litigation to the infringer is the ability to "fix" the
meaning of claims or claim terms, something that can make design-
around significantly easier. By locking patent claims into a single,
fixed meaning via court decisions and issue preclusion, an accused
infringer can create a fixed patent scope that it can design around.
This benefit will become even greater as it becomes harder to use
continuation applications to draft claims that read on to a new
product.46
The first step in assessing whether a given product or process
infringes a patent claim is to ascertain the scope of that claim. The
words of the claims themselves set out the "metes and bounds" of that
which is claimed.47 The specific "territory" that is contained within
46. Prior to 1995, for example, the length of the term for a given patent depended on the
date of issuance of the patent. This was true even for continuation applications filed years after
the application to which that continuation claimed priority. In 1995, however, the statutory
patent length was adjusted and is now based on the priority date, rather than the date of issuance
for all subsequent patent applications. This change made behavior such as Lemelson's famous
patent submarining much more difficult for all patents claiming priority to a post-1995
application. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000); Jeffrey D. Sullivan and David Loretto, Symbol
Technologies v. Lemeson, Prosecution Laches, and the Still-Unmet Challenges of Junking "Junk
Patents, " 33 AIPLA Q.J. 285, n.50 (2005). For further discussion of this issue, see Kimberly A.
Moore and Mark Lemley, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 BOSTON U. L. REv. 63
(2004),
47. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("It is a
'bedrock principle' of patent law that 'the claims of a patent define the invention to which the
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this interpretation is called the literal claim scope.48 Any product or
process that falls within the literal claim scope can be said to literally
infringe; thus, this is typically the first level of analysis when
performing an infringement analysis.49 It is also the first analysis that
would be performed by a firm that intended to design around the
patent.
Ascertaining the literal claim scope is often not a simple matter.
Because the words of the claim determine the scope, the specific
meaning of those words is very important. Moreover, words can have
a variety of meanings - even non-technical words. Take, for instance,
the following patent claim:
A method for enabling a user of an electronic multi-function card
to select data from a plurality of data sources such as credit cards,
check cards, customer cards, identity cards, documents, keys,
access information and master keys comprising the steps of:
transferring a data set from each of the plurality of data
sources to the multi-function card;
storing said transferred data set from each of the plurality of
data sources in the multi-function card;
assigning a secret code to activate the multi-function card;
entering said secret code into the multi-function card to
activate the same;
selecting with said activated multi-function card a select one
of said data sets; and
displaying on the multi-function card in at least one
predetermined display area the data of said selected data set. 50
It is unclear precisely what is meant by the term "card" in this
claim. Is it a card like a credit card? Something larger? Does it need
to be made out of any particular material? Simply looking at the word
in context does not answer these questions; indeed, the claim could
even refer to a computer card, of the type used in a desktop
patentee is entitled the right to exclude."' (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
48. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("If properly construed claims read on the infringing product, there is literal
infringement.").
49. See id
50. U.S. Patent No. 5,276,311 Claim 1 (filed July 1, 1992) [hereinafter the '311 patent]
(emphasis added).
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computer.51 The ordinary meaning of the term is a relevant
consideration, but so is the specification.52 In this case, the
specification suggests that an aspect of the invention is "electronic
storages in a card-like very flat housing." 53 This phrase does not
provide significant assistance in interpreting the claim term.
Further confounding the issue of claim scope is disagreement
among reasonable people over the meaning of claim terms. For
instance, when this claim was interpreted in E-Pass Technologies v.
3Com Corp., the district court determined that the term meant "[a]
device having the width and outer dimensions of a standard credit
card with an embedded electronic circuit allowing for the conversion
of the card to the form and function of at least two different single-
purpose cards."54 On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed, instead
concluding that the term "card," as used in the '311 patent, referred
simply to "a flat rectangular piece of stiff material. 55 The claim
element at issue in E-Pass is merely one example of the uncertainty
inherent in attempting to ascertain the meaning of patent claims. And
where there is uncertainty in the meaning of claim terms, it may be
difficult or impossible to assess the full literal scope of the claims.
To be sure, there are rules for interpreting claim language. When
interpreting claims, one must always start with the language of the
claims themselves, and the context they provide to the claim terms.
56
The claims are interpreted according to their "ordinary and customary
meaning," that is to say, "the meaning that the term would have to a
person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention., 57 That person is considered to have read the claim term in
the context of the patent specification and prosecution history.58
While it is inappropriate to interpret the claim terms in light of the
accused device, "knowledge of that product or process provides
meaningful context for the first step of the infringement analysis,
51. See, e.g.
http://shop2.outpost.com/product/3506224?site=sr:SEARCH:MAINRSLTPG (last visited
August 14, 2006) (copy on file with author) (offering for sale a PPA IEEE1394 PCI memory
storage card designed to be placed inside a desktop computer).
52. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
53. '311 patent supra note 50, at col.2, 1.24-25.
54. E-Pass Techs v. 3Com Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
55. E-Pass Techs. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
56. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
57. ld. at 1313.
58. Biagro Western Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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claim construction., 59 These rules, however, provide only a general
framework for interpreting claim terms - determining the scope of a
particular claim depends heavily on the particular circumstances of
the patent and the technology of the patent.
Because of this uncertainty in assessing the scope of a given
claim, or set of claims, any mechanism by which an infringer can pin
down the boundaries of a patent claim can assist in designing around
that claim. Once a patent claim has been litigated, and an
infringement determination made, the patentee will necessarily be
locked into certain meanings under two doctrines: issue preclusion
and preclusion of inconsistent positions.60
Issue preclusion operates when a court has settled a factual issue
after a trial in which the issue was fully and fairly litigated. It requires
that four elements be met: the issues precluded are the same as those
involved in the prior litigation; that the issues were actually litigated;
that the determination of those issues was "essential" to the prior
judgment; and that the party precluded had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issues.6 ' In the context of claim construction, a patentee
can be precluded if the determination of scope was essential to a final
judgment on either the question of validity or infringement. 62 In the
post-litigation scenario where design-around is most likely to arise - a
holding of both infringement and non-invalidity - the claim
construction finding may meet the factor that it be essential to a final
judgment.63
Estoppel based on the doctrine of inconsistent positions may also
apply to prevent a patentee from modifying its claim construction for
subsequent litigations. As articulated in Hybritech v. Abbott
Laboratories, a patent holder may be precluded from taking a position
in a subsequent action inconsistent with a position in a prior action,
unless the opposing party fails to demonstrate either "(1) personal
reliance on the decision granted in the prior suit, (2) prejudice to its
litigation of the issues in the present suit by reason of the decision in
the prior suit, or (3) the patent holder's apparent misuse of the
59. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-27
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
60. Jackson Jordon, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61. Comair Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 49 F.3d 1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
62. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
63. See, e.g., Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Del
Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Monsanto Co. v.
Bayer Bioscience, 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004); but see Jackson Jordon, 747 F.2d at 1578
(finding that a prior claim construction was not essential to the final judgment).
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court." 64 Given that the infringer in the design-around situation
posited here would be a repeat player, it would likely be able to
demonstrate both reliance and prejudice in subsequent litigations.
Nor are the effects of issue preclusion and the doctrine of
inconsistent positions necessarily limited to the literal scope of a
claim, they can also affect the scope of the claim under the doctrine of
equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents is a legal theory that allows
for a patent claim to include devices or methods that do not fall within
its literal metes and bounds.65 It focuses on whether a particular
element of an accused product or process is equivalent to the missing
literal element of the claim.66 One method of evaluating whether a
particular element is an equivalent is the function-way-result test.
Under this test, the given element of the accused device is equivalent
if it performs substantially the same function, in substantially the
same way, to achieve substantially the same result as the missing
claim element.67 There are limitations on the scope of equivalents,
most importantly whether the claim was amended in such a manner as
to specifically exclude the equivalent.68 In addition, under the "all
limitations rule," each claim limitation must have an equivalent in the
accused device. Thus, a standard design-around strategy is to
eliminate one or more of the limitations found in the independent
69
claims of a patent - in particular, a functional limitation.
As with fixing the literal scope of the patent claims through
litigation, a skilled infringer may also be able to pin down the range
of equivalents. For instance, an infringer could force the patentee to
define the relevant function of a particular claim element, or the way
in which that function is performed. In such a situation, even if
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was actually found, a
64. Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
65. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21
(1997).
66. Id. at 24-25.
67. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc'n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
68. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368-
69 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
69. See Paul N. Katz and Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around a United States Patent, 45
S. TEX. L. REV. 647, 678-79 (2004) ("The all limitations rule leads to the design around strategy
of elimination. Applications of the all elements rule in a design around effort involves
attempting to eliminate any of the limitations found in the independent claims - especially
functional limitations."). If a patentee can eliminate a functional limitation, they may be able to
avoid any finding of equivalency, especially under the "function-way-result" test, since there
will be no element that performs the same function.
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patentee might nevertheless later be precluded from rearguing the
function of the relevant element under the doctrine of issue preclusion
or from seeking a broader construction under the doctrine of
inconsistent positions.
In short, because the ability to design around a patent claim
depends so heavily on the particular scope that is captured by that
claim, anything that helps to define that scope will be beneficial to the
firm attempting the design around.70 Litigation, through the doctrines
of issue preclusion and inconsistent position, may assist in providing
additional stabilization to patent claims, thus aiding a firm's ability to
design around those claims.
2. Tactical Benefits
While the option to file a declaratory judgment action is not
always one that is available to the infringer, there are strong tactical
advantages for doing so. In particular, the ability to select the
geographic location where the litigation will take place can provide a
significant advantage. Selecting the forum may enable the infringer to
gain a home court advantage, providing benefits from those that are as
minor as minimizing travel to those as significant as a sympathetic
jury. As Professor Kimberly Moore has demonstrated, in cases where
the infringer was able to choose the forum by initiating litigation, the
infringer has a substantially higher chance of winning.
71
In examining win rates for tried cases, Moore found that 14% of
the 1,209 tried cases were declaratory judgment actions brought by an
infringer.7 When the infringer selected the forum, the patentee won a
mere 44% of tried cases; in contrast, when the patentee selected the
forum, it won 58% of the time.73 Moore further demonstrated that this
difference was not due to the theory that declaratory judgment suits as
a whole are stronger on the merits than suits brought by patentees;
instead, this difference appeared to be solely due to who chose the
forum.
7 4
Other strategic benefits can be obtained by forcing litigation
early. For instance, the patent local rules of the Northern District of
70. See id at 684 (suggesting that firms seeking to design around a patent engage outside
patent counsel in order to aid in determining what is required to properly design around the
patented invention).
71. Moore, supra note 13, at 920.
72. ld. at 921.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 922-23 n.114.
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California set forth a short timetable for exchanging contentions and
documents in patent litigation. Under those rules, the patentee must
provide its preliminary infringement contentions within a mere 10
days after the initial case management conference; along with those
contentions they must also produce a host of documents bearing on
invention and validity.75 While this deadline may not be put into
practice on a regular basis, an aggressive infringer may be able to use
it to its advantage - especially if it is already prepared to meet its own
obligations under those local rules.76
These tactical advantages can provide a strong motivation to an
infringer to initiate litigation, if it can do so by filing a declaratory
judgment action. Of course, an infringer's ability to file such an
action depends on the particular circumstances of its situation - some
infringers may be able to file a declaratory judgment action, while
others may not.7 7 Moreover, an action for declaratory judgment will
likely bring a counter-action filed by the patentee in a district of its
own choosing, a risk that the prudent infringer would need to take
into account when filing for declaratory relief.
3. For Informational Purposes
An accused infringer can gain significant information about the
validity and enforceability of a patentee's patents via litigation
discovery. This additional information will increase the accuracy of
the assessment of the threat posed by the patentee. Similarly, the
infringer can provide information about the strength of its own case
via discovery.
Information asymmetry refers to a situation where each party has
different information about the other party's position. Such
asymmetry can affect the firms' behaviors and strategic decisions.78
For instance, take the simple case of a patentee who knows that a
particular piece of prior art poses a significant threat of anticipation or
obviousness to its patent claims, while the infringer is unaware of this
piece of prior art. In such a situation, an appropriately phrased
discovery request may reveal the existence of such a document. Even
more extreme is the situation of inequitable conduct. In nearly all
75. Patent Local Rules of the Northern District of California, 3-1 and 3-2.
76. See id. at 3-3 and 3-4.
77. For instance, in order to file an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the
plaintiff must have a reasonable apprehension of suit. See infra section V.C.
78. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERNER, AND RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 123 (1994).
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situations, an infringer is unlikely to learn of inequitable conduct
outside the litigation context, since inequitable conduct involves
information that is internal to the patentee. 79 Litigation discovery may
thus provide a valuable tool for curing this informational asymmetry
and increasing the strength of the infringer's position.8°
In addition, litigation discovery forces the patentee to lay out
their position with regard to the scope of their claims, thus providing
the infringer with information about the strength of the patentee's
position. And, as noted in section IV.A, the patentee may be
precluded from taking a different position in later litigation based on
statements made in earlier litigation. Rules such as those adopted by
the Northern District of California explicitly outline the information
that each party is required to provide the other.81 The infringer can use
this information to further evaluate its position with respect to the
patent.
There is a down side to curing the information asymmetry, of
course, as discovery is a two way street. Just as the infringer may gain
additional information about the validity and enforceability of the
patents, the patentee will be able to gain additional information about
the infringer's own behavior. Nevertheless, if the infringer's product
is public, and the patentee is already able to make an infringement
assessment based on that product, independent of any additional
discovery, the benefits of curing the information asymmetry may
substantially outweigh the detriments.
4. The Silver Lining of a Validity Finding
Finally, the possibility that the infringer will prevail based on a
finding of noninfringement while the patentee prevails on the issue of
validity, raises the potential for the infringer to actually gain a
positive benefit from the litigation (rather than simply avoiding the
cost of a license). Under this outcome, the patent is still in place, and
while the patentee can no longer assert it against the infringer, it can
79. See, e.g., Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants on Fire: Towards a Narrow
Construction for Inequitable Conduct as Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and
Drug Patent Applications, 72 UMKC L. REv. 669, 673-76 (2004) (describing the patentee's
incentives to engage in inequitable conduct to be based, in part, on the belief that such activities
would not be known to the public at large).
80. Of course, discovery is not a transparent window through which an infringer can view
all of the patentee's information; defenses of privilege may be used to shield critical documents,
for instance.
81. See, e.g., Patent Local Rule 3-1, "Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Preliminary
Infringement Contentions," Northern District of California Patent Local Rules.
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still be asserted against the infringer's competitors, forcing them to
either pay for a license, or litigate the patent. If an accused infringer
succeeds in winning a noninfringement challenge, they will be free to
market their own product. However, competitors, whose products
may exhibit some differences, may not be able to rely on the same
noninfringement finding, and the patentee may be able to threaten
them with the patent. 82 Thus, the litigator-infringer gains the benefit
of freedom to operate without a license, while its competitors may
not. This can create a positive benefit for the patentee.83
These differences in outcome can be summarized as follows. If
the patentee wins a validity challenge, the patentee gains small, and
the infringer loses small. If the infringer wins, the patentee loses big,
and the infringer gains small. In contrast, if the patentee wins an
infringement challenge, the patentee wins small and the infringer
loses small. If the infringer wins, however, the patentee wins larger
than they would have won if they had won the invalidity challenge,
and the infringer loses smaller than they would have lost in the
invalidity loss. The following outcomes chart illustrates this:
Infringement
Noninfringement Infringement
No invalidity -10, 5 10, -10
Validity Invalidity 
-100, 0 -100, 0
In this chart, the results of each possible outcome are displayed
in the box under, or to the right of, that possibility. The value placed
on that outcome by the patentee is listed first, and the infringer
second. For example, the value of an outcome where there is a finding
of both noninfringement and invalidity is -100 to the patentee (since it
will have lost the patent) and 0 for the infringer (since it will not be
required to pay any damages due to the patent having been found
invalid and not infringed).
82. While issue preclusion can operate to bar a patentee's suit against other infringers
based on a patent that has been found to be invalid, it does not necessarily do so when there has
been a finding of noninfringement. See, e.g., Comair Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 49
F.3d 1535, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
83. This benefit is independent of the benefit that a successful infringer would receive
under a system such as that proposed by professor Miller, in which a challenger that defeats a
patent receives a litigation-stage bounty. See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better
Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004).
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The numbers in this example reflect* one possibility of
differences in outcomes. 84 As one can see, the only positive payoff
available to the patentee through litigation is if there is a finding of no
invalidity and infringement. In contrast, the infringer will receive a
positive payoff either if the patent is declared invalid, or if they are
found not to infringe. This game also demonstrates why the patent
troll may be disincentivized to enter the litigation. If the patentee
wins, the payoff is only modest. If the patentee loses, however, the
penalty ranges from moderately severe to extremely severe,
depending on the form of the loss.
B. The Cost to the Infringer of Not Litigating
While the infringer may be able to avoid paying the final cost of
losing litigation by settling, there is another cost that must be taken
into account - that of choosing not to litigate. In particular, an
infringer's decision to not litigate shouts to the world that it is
vulnerable, and that it is willing to pay off other potential trolls. This
may result in infringers choosing to litigate, even when the cost of
doing so equals the amount demanded by the troll.
One method for describing why an infringer would not want to
convey the image of an entity that is not willing to litigate is the
concept of signaling. Signaling is the process by which one party
conveys non-verifiable information to another party through the
actions it takes.85 Signaling occurs when those with nonverifiable
information convey that information by the actions they choose.86 For
instance, obtaining a patent portfolio may send a signal that a firm is
an innovative firm.87 In this section, I suggest that regardless of the
infringer's propensity to litigate or desire to license, rational
infringers will be driven towards litigation due to the signaling results
of not litigating.
So how does signaling influence infringer behavior towards
litigation? Consider the situation of two types of infringers: litigious
84. In this example, the patentees place a high value on the loss of their patent (-100).
Given the issues discussed in section IV.D, however, that need not necessarily be the case -
indeed, a patentee might place a significantly lower value on a single patent. In such a situation,
a patentee might be more willing to risk litigation, because they would have less to lose; on the
flip side, their incentive to win the litigation might be low. In other words, if the patentee has a
high cost if they lose, they will not be willing to litigate, while if the cost of losing is low, they
will not necessarily have a greater incentive that the infringer to win.
85. Baird et. al., supra note 78, at 123.
86. Id.
87. See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 625, 659-60 (2002).
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infringers and non-litigious infringers. Litigious infringers like to
litigate; non-litigious infringers prefer to license. 8 If the patentee
offers a license that is equal to the cost to the infringer of litigating,
the litigious infringer will litigate 90% of the time, and will license
the patent 10% of the time. In contrast, when the litigation cost is the
same as the license cost, the non-litigious infringer will litigate only
10% of the time, and will license 90% of the time. A patentee has no
way of knowing whether a given infringer is litigious or non-litigious
aside from the infringer's actions.
If the infringer litigates, rather than taking a license, the patentee
will only gain a small amount, since the litigation costs for the
patentee include both the possibility of losing the patent entirely and
the actual costs of the litigation, while the return is likely to be
relatively small.8 9 In contrast, if the infringer licenses, the patentee
will gain a higher return, as the patent will not be jeopardized and the
infringer will not need to pay the litigation costs. Moreover, the value
of not litigating against an infringer is modest - more than the value
of litigating (due to the lack of litigation costs and potential loss of the
patent), but less than the amount of a license.
Thus, if the infringer litigates, the patentee knows that there is a
90% chance that the infringer is a litigious infringer. In that situation,
the value of seeking a license with the infringer in the future is
significantly reduced - since the infringer is more likely to force the
patentee to actually litigate, rather than simply paying for a license. In
contrast, if the infringer does not litigate, the patentee knows that
there is an 82% probability that they will license rather than litigate
the next time, and thus would be a good candidate for future licensing
attempts.90
While this analysis initially suggests that a patentee would want
to avoid litigating infringers in the future, and seek out non-litigating
88. A litigious company may be more likely to litigate than a non-litigious company
because it has lower costs. For instance, it may create an in-house litigation department to
handle litigation. Or it may establish routine document retention policies that will reduce the
costs of future litigations. Some companies that are subject to frequent litigation may even hire a
law firm that is dedicated to handling all their discovery needs.
89. For a discussion of the costs of litigating to a patentee, see discussion infra section
Iv.c.1.
90. The patentee knows that there is a 90% probability that the infringer is a non-litigious
infringer. The next time the non-litigious infringer is threatened by a patentee, they will have a
90% chance of the infringer being a non-litigious infringer, with a 90% chance of licensing
(81% chance of licensing), and a 10% chance of the infringer being a litigious infringer, with a
10% chance of licensing (1% chance of licensing). Thus, the patentee can conclude that there is
an 82% chance that the infringer will license the next time.
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infringers, a closer examination reveals that the result of this behavior
is to encourage all infringers to litigate. If an infringer knows a priori
that future license requests will be discounted if they choose to
litigate, they will be more likely to litigate, despite their tendencies in
the absence of such knowledge. Thus, regardless of whether it is a
litigious or non-litigious infringer, an infringer would litigate, even
when the cost differential for litigating versus taking a license is
negligible.
There are other considerations to take into account, however.
The above scenario assumes two critical pieces of information: that
the patentee knows how much the infringer would be willing to pay to
avoid litigation, and that the infringer's probability of litigating does
not change between the two points.
With regard to the first assumption, the same pooling holds true
even when the settlement point for the infringer is unknown to the
patentee. For instance, consider two infringers, one with a low
settlement point and one with a high settlement point.9' When offered
a license amount falling between the two points, the low-settlement
infringer will litigate, while the high-settlement infringer will license.
Such a situation would signal to a patentee that the non-litigating
infringer has a high license value, while the litigating infringer has a
low license value, thus causing it to discount the value of interacting
with the litigating infringer in the future. In contrast, the patentee will
seek to threaten the high-settlement value infringer with another
patent, thus deriving additional revenue. Here, although the
propensity of the high settlement value infringer is initially to license,
the optimal end position for both types of infringers is the situation
where they litigate once, and then are left alone.92 However, because
the patentee knows that the pool of litigants will include both high
and low infringers, it will necessarily need to enforce their patent
against both.
The second assumption - that the infringer's position will not
change between the two points - is one that cannot be perfectly
controlled for. There are certainly factors that could result in the
infringer taking different positions between the time it is threatened
91. For a discussion of settlement points, see discussion infra section V.A.
92. Note that if the high-settlement infringer's settlement point is sufficiently high to take
into account both the current license costs and the future license cost, it may actually be optimal
for it to license the patent. In such a scenario, however, the patentee would have vastly
undervalued the infringer's settlement point. In addition, knowing that such super-high
settlement point infringers exist, patentees will be especially interested in infringers that deviate
from the litigation pool, since they may suspect that they fall into this category.
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with the first patent, and the time when it is threatened with the
second patent. For instance, the two situations would necessarily
involve different patents, with different expected levels of success;
there could be different products involved, or different potential
93damages. This noise can reduce the validity of the signaling process.
Despite this noise, however, the equilibrium still suggests that, on an
individual infringer level, infringers will place a higher value on
litigation as opposed to licensing.
C. The Costs to the Patentee ofLitigating
This category encompasses the costs the patentee must pay if it
chooses to litigate to enforce its patents. Of particular relevance here
is the possibility that a patentee's discovery costs may equal - or
exceed - those of the infringer.94 For instance, in the context of
pharmaceutical products, an infringer may be able to substantially
avoid expensive and time-consuming discovery into its own acts, due
to the existence of an Abbreviated New Drug Application, or ANDA,
while the patentee is faced with much more costly and extensive
discovery. Another example of a relatively inexpensive (for the
infringer) form of "litigating" is the ex partes reexamination. On the
other side of the equation, the costs for the patentee may be quite
high. For instance, inequitable conduct claims raise the possibility of
extensive fact discovery into the patentee's actions, while the massive
scale of discovery into electronic documents may increase discovery
costs exponentially.
1. Low Costs for Infringers
One situation in which the infringer's discovery costs may be
limited, as discussed above, is when infringement is based on the
filing of an ANDA. In addition to lowering the outright cost for filing
an application to market a drug product, the ANDA system can
significantly reduce the discovery costs of an accused infringer.
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"), a
company seeking to manufacture a new drug product is required to
file a New Drug Application (NDA) with the Federal Food and Drug
93. Long, supra note 87, at 660.
94. This section focuses primarily on discovery costs. While there may be other facts that
drive total litigation costs, discovery costs have been described as accounting for 50-90% of
litigation costs. See Christopher Koa, Digital or Paper, NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, April 4,
2005.
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Administration (FDA).95 Preparing a NDA is a costly and time-
consuming process. One of the most time consuming and costly
elements of an NDA are the detailed clinical studies of the drug's
safety and efficacy.96 These clinical studies frequently involve
hundreds of subjects, and may cost tens of millions of dollars (or
more) each.97 Prior to the early 1980's, a firm that sought to market a
generic version of a drug that was already on the market was required
to fulfill the same safety and efficacy requirements as an innovator
company marketing a new drug.98 Due to the high costs associated
with these studies, bringing a generic drug to market was an
expensive undertaking. At the same time, because the entry of the
generic product would increase the competition in the market, thus
driving prices down, the marginal value that the generic company
could extract would be much smaller than that of the innovator
company.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (the "Hatch Waxman Act") created a new option for firms that
wanted to market a generic drug product: the ANDA.99 Under the
changes wrought by the Hatch Waxman Act, a firm seeking to market
a generic version of a previously approved drug product can file an
ANDA with the FDA.100 Unlike a NDA, an ANDA simply requires
that the drug product be "bioequivalent" to the previously approved
drug.10' In order for a drug product to be "bioequivalent" to the
product already on the market, the active ingredient must be absorbed
at the same rate, and to the same extent, for the generic drug as for the
innovator drug. 1
02
95. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000).
96. Id. at § 355(b)(1) (2000).
97. Chana R. Schoenberger, An Alzheimer's Drug Goes on Trial, March 20, 2000
available at
http://www.healthdec.com/docs/ForbesAlzheimersDrugGoes On Trial.pdf#search=%22pha
rmaccutical%20testing%20costs%22) (last visited September 7, 2006) (noting that "[a] typical
study would take five years and $110 million for the Phase III trial.").
98. John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason, 11 J. TECH. L.
& POL'Y 1, 6.
99. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000), 21
U.S.C. 360cc (2002), and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2000).
101. See § 355(j)(2)(A) (2000).
102. 355(j)(8)(A) (2000). Bioequivalence is typically demonstrated by conducting human
clinical studies involving administration of both the brand name reference product and the
generic test product. The specific requirements for establishing bioequivalence are set forth in
various FDA Guidelines. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Food and Drug
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Once an ANDA application is filed, any patentees holding
patents covering the drug have 45 days to bring an infringement suit
based on the filing of the ANDA. °3 If a patentee brings suit within
this time period, they gain a number of benefits; most notably, an
automatic stay is imposed on the approval of the ANDA.10 4 While this
litigation is focused on the product that the generic ultimately seeks to
market, that product will necessarily be described within the ANDA,
which by law is required to describe the components and method of
manufacturing the product, can easily suffice to answer many
questions about a given product. 105 Thus, the majority of the key
documents relevant to the question of infringement will be contained
in the ANDA itself. Given this situation, an accused infringer may be
in a position to satisfy many of its discovery obligations before the
litigation begins, thus keeping its discovery costs low in both time and
money.
Another method for keeping litigation costs low for the infringer
is to request an ex partes reexamination from the PTO. While not true
adversarial litigation, an ex partes reexamination allows the infringer
to attack the validity of the troll's patents without incurring high cost
or exposing itself to significant risk. The most well publicized
example is that of Research in Motion (RIM), producers of the
Blackberry device. During the hotly contested patent litigation
between RIM and NTP, Inc. (the patent holder), RIM submitted a
request for a reexamination of NTP's patents.10 6 RIM hoped, by virtue
of the reexamination, to have the patents declared invalid - despite
the fact that a jury had just rendered a verdict against RIM based on
those same patents.
10 7
A request for an ex partes reexamination may be filed by
anyone, at any time. 0 8 The basis for the reexamination is typically
Administration, Statistical Approaches to Establishing Bioequivalence, (2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Cder/guidance/3616fnl.pdf.
103. The NDA must include a list of patents that claim the drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). If
the NDA is approved, the FDA publishes a listing of the drug and patents on the drug in the
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, or "Orange Book." See 21
C.F.R. § 314.53(e) (2001).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(A) (1994).
105. See21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2001).
106. Rim.net, Injunction Stayed In NTP Inc. vs. RIM Litigation,
http://www.rim.net/news/press/2003/pr-05-082003.shtml (last visited August 14, 2006).
107. Id. For more information on the RIM-NTP dispute, see Kirk Teska, The Story Behind
the BlackBerry Case, available at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/mar06/3087 (last visited March
2006);
108. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
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prior art that was not previously before the examiner, or art that raises
a substantial new question of patentability. The process begins when
the requester files a request that cites the relevant prior art and
explains the relevancy of the cited prior art to each claim for which
reexamination is requested. 109 Within three months, the PTO will
determine whether there is a substantial new question of patentability
of any claim of the relevant patent. 110 If the PTO determines that such
a question exists, the reexamination will be initiated." 1 Once initiated,
the requestor does not participate in the reexamination proceeding
except to file a response to the patent holder's initial opposition. 112
Otherwise, the proceedings are conducted entirely exparte.
While an ex partes reexamination proceeding does not offer
much opportunity for the infringer to participate, initiating such a
procedure has benefits that direct litigation does not offer. First, if the
PTO decides that any claims of the patent are, in fact, invalid in light
of the newly raised substantial question of validity, the PTO will issue
a certificate canceling those claims.13 However, if the PTO does not
conclude that the claims are invalid, the requestor is not bound by that
decision; it may still contest validity in a subsequent court
proceeding. 114 Finally, there is no presumption of validity during the
reexamination proceedings.
1 15
Of course, there are some fairly major limitations and drawbacks
to an exparte reexamination proceeding. In addition to the inability of
the requestor to participate in the proceeding to any significant extent,
a reexamination proceeding also allows the patentee the opportunity
to narrow the scope of their claims, thus avoiding the effects of the
prior art that is before the examiner.1 16 The PTO may also reject the
conclusion that the patent is invalid - although if the patentee was
forced to narrow the claims in order to avoid prior art, the infringer
may still see a benefit. While a court is not bound by the rejection of
the potential cause for invalidity, it is evidence that must be
109. Id.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000). Note that the PTO may also initiate a reexamination
proceeding sua sponte. Id.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
112. Id.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 307 (2000). As with a decision rejecting the patentability of a claim in the
context of the initial examination, such a finding in a reexamination may be appealed. 35 U.S.C.
§ 306 (2000).
114. See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
115. Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 952 F.2d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
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considered and increases the burden of proof on the infringer
challenging the patent.'1 7  Finally, the "substantial question of
validity" is one that is based only on prior art - the authorizing statute
says nothing about section 112 invalidity or unenforceability." 8
Despite these limitations, ex partes reexamination proceedings
can provide a low-cost mechanism through which an infringer can
"challenge" a particular patent or set of patents. And while the costs
to the requestor remain fairly low, the patentee must shoulder the
burden of defending its already issued patent.' 19
2. High Costs for Patentees
On the patentee side, a number of factors can lead to high
discovery costs for the patentee. For instance, assertions of
inequitable conduct can expand the scope of discovery far beyond the
asserted claims themselves, drastically increasing the patentee's
discovery costs, and influencing the patent holder's willingness to
litigate. Similarly, the expanding use of electronic storage media can
lead to spiraling discovery costs, not just for the infringer, but also for
the patent holder.
Claims that a party engaged in inequitable conduct are routine in
modem patent litigation. While inequitable conduct claims tend to fail
more often than they are raised,120 the discovery costs associated with
such a claim do not depend on whether the claim is ultimately
successful; all that is required is the ability to make out such a claim.
While the Federal Circuit has spoken strongly against the overuse of
this type of patent defense, 12land despite the relative difficulty of
117. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
118. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
119. In addition to the ex partes reexamination proceeding, in 1999 Congress created an
inter partes reexamination mechanism that allowed for greater participation by the requestor.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2000). However, the disadvantages of an interpartes reexamination
for an accused infringer are fairly high - while the requestor is greatly limited in their ability to
present their case, they are also bound by an adverse decision. As a result, inter partes
reexamination proceedings are a highly disfavored device. See Qin Shi, Reexamination,
Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative Efforts to Create a Post-Grant Patent Quality Control
System, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 433, 446-51 (2003).
120. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("Even after complete testimony the court should find inequitable conduct only if shown by
clear and convincing evidence. A summaryjudgment that a reputable attorney has been guilty of
inequitable conduct, over his denials, ought to be, and can properly be, rare indeed.").
121. See id. ("[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent
case has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the
charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client's
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proving an inequitable conduct defense, their use today is
commonplace. 122 Based on data on patent decisions published by the
University of Houston Law Center, between 2000 and 2004, 168
inequitable conduct decisions were rendered, in which infringers
prevailed 53 times. 123 These decisions were thus nearly as frequent as
adjudications based on obviousness (229), illustrating how frequently
inequitable conduct claims are raised. 124 Moreover, this data simply
represents the number of inequitable conduct claims that were
actually adjudicated; the number that were pleaded, or raised in
interrogatory responses, may actually be much higher. 125 Inequitable
conduct may be an especially tempting claim to make against a patent
troll who has engaged in multiple continuations, since behavior within
the entire period up until the issuance of the most recent patent could
arguably fall within the scope of an inequitable conduct claim. 126
In contrast with validity defenses, which depend either on what
is said on the face of the document (in the case of Section 112
challenges) or on the date of conception and reduction to practice (in
the case of anticipation or obviousness), raising the specter of
inequitable conduct allows for much broader discovery. For instance,
while a patentee may be able to object to producing documents
created after the filing date of the patent as not relevant to a Section
102, 103, or 112 defense, inequitable conduct encompasses
documents created after the filing date of the patent.' 27  This
broadening of the discovery scope increases the costs to the patentees
who must respond. 
128
interest adequately, perhaps.").
122. One analysis found that 75% of inequitable conduct claims that had been made were
rejected by the district court either on summary judgment or at trial, suggesting that the current
system enables infringers to attack valid patents by alleging inequitable conduct where none
exists. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating
the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 163-64 (2005).
123. Patstats.org, Univ. Houston Law Center Decisions 2000 - 2004, available at
http://www.patstats.org/Composite%20Table%20(2000-2004).html.
124. Id. For further discussion of these statistics, see Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable
Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BEREKELY TECH. L. J. 147,
155-56 (2006).
125. Inequitable conduct, which is a form of fraud, must be pleaded with particularity. See
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1770, 1775 (N.D. Cal.
1996). However, this would not prevent an aggressive litigant from raising an inequitable
conduct claim as a basis to gain discovery into the patent holder's documents.
126. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2005).
127. See id.
128. The high costs of providing discovery when an inequitable conduct claim exists are
well recognized by practitioners. See, e.g., Joseph N. Hosteny, Inequitable Conduct: A Time
Waster, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, August 2000, available at
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Another factor that can contribute to high discovery costs for the
patentee is the almost universal use of electronic files. Prior to the
development of inexpensive, readily available computers, with
gigabytes of storage space, most documents existed only in paper
form. The use of these electronic files has greatly increased the
amount of documents that may need to be produced. For instance, one
electronic discovery company estimates that a one gigabyte of
Microsoft® Word® files is equivalent to approximately 65,000 paper
pages. 129 Given that an average computer can have a hard drive of 110
gigabytes or more (and a typical server as much as a terabyte or
more), one can imagine the potential universe of documents. 130 In
addition, because of the ease in storing electronic documents, 131 many
documents are retained because there is no compelling reason to
discard them. Consequently, the patentee who must search a mere five
or six computers is dealing with a document collection that potentially
numbers in the millions of pages. Accordingly, the burdens of
document collection and production on each party have become
significantly greater, such that the potential scope encompasses an
effectively infinite number of documents.' 32 Moreover, this trend of a
larger and larger document universe is ones that will only increase as
stored electronic data continues to grow. 133 This will in turn increase
the patentee's discovery costs.
Litigation costs are certainly a factor that an infringer may
consider when choosing whether to litigate or negotiate in the face of
a patent threat. Given their importance, the potential for high
http://hosteny.com/archive/hosteny/2007-
00.pdf#search=%22inequitable%20conduct%20discovery/o22) (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
129. See How Many Pages in a Gigabyte, on Applied Discovery's website, available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADIFSPagesnAGigabyt
e.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
130. For a discussion of the rapid growth of computer storage capabilities, see Chip
Walter, Kryder's Law, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=000BOC22-
0805-12D8-BDFD83414B7FOOO0&ref-sciam&chanlD=saOO6 (last visited November 3, 2006).
131. See Matthew M. Neumeier, Brian D. Hansen, and Irinia Y. Dmitrieva, Paper or
Plastic? - The Hunt for Electronic Treasure During Discovery, I MEALY'S LITIGATION REPORT:
Discovery 1, 3 (December 2003).
132. Zubulake v. UBS Warbug, 91 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1574, 1578 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting that "[tihe more information there is to discover, the more expensive it is to
discover all the relevant information until, in the end, 'discovery is not just about uncovering the
truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter."').
133. For a further discussion of the tremendous costs that can potentially be associated
with electronic documents, including problems due to increase volume, increased storage sites,
and the risks of spoliation, see Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation, 2000 FED. CTS. L. REv. 2 (2001).
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discovery costs for the patentee and low discovery costs for the
infringer may impact the infringer's decision. 134
D. The Price to the Patentee of Losing
In addition to the foregoing benefits from litigating, a firm
threatened by a patent troll can gain a substantial economic advantage
by litigating. As discussed above in section III, a patent troll has only
one real asset: its patent. Through litigation, a threatened infringer can
turn the tables on the patentee and threaten the patent troll's own
assets - possibly driving the value of the litigation to the infringer
below zero. By aggressively challenging the patent troll's sole asset, a
target hits the patent troll's most valuable (and only) strength.135
A patent troll's ideal strategy is to simply license, and to never
litigate. 116 Litigation carries the serious risk of losing the patent - and
correspondingly, not just the profits that could be obtained from the
litigating infringer, but the profits that can be obtained from all
potential infringers.' 37 This creates a strong incentive for the patentee
to avoid litigation, or at least, to only engage in litigation when there
is a substantial reward for doing so or it has a high probability of
winning.
For instance, consider a patentee who holds a patent that
arguably covers five infringers. In any single litigation, the patentee
risks having the patent invalidated, thus losing the possibility of
134. It is also important to keep in mind that any effects arising from equal discovery costs
- or even imbalanced ones favoring the infringer - will primarily be reaped by the first infringer
to litigate against the patentee. Once a patentee has conducted a litigation document search, they
can use those documents for subsequent litigations, thus minimizing future discovery costs.
Thus, only the first litigant is able to reap the benefits of the shift in discovery costs to a more
equal playing field. Subsequent defenders will need to search for and produce documents, while
dealing with a patentee whose discovery costs are minimal.
135. See American Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, Inc., 379 F.2d 376,
379 (7th Cir. 1967) ("The owner of a patent should have the privilege of making a fair
investigation as to the possible infringement of his patent without calling down on his head the
undertaking of... an expensive and burdensome declaratory judgment suit.").
136. Chan and Fawcett, supra note 2, at 3 ("A patent troll's only goal is to extract quick
cash, not to create technology development, partnerships, or cross-licensing opportunities. The
business model patent trolls employ is relatively uniform at its most basic level: (1) accuse a
company of infringing a patent and offer a license for a royalty on sales; and (2) if the target
company does not agree to a license, sue them.")
137. This high cost of losing the patent has been recognized to create asymmetric risks for
the patentee and the infringer, thus making the patentee more risk-averse to trial. See Kimberly
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases - An Empircal Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 365, 377 (2000). Where the patent is the patentee's sole asset (as in the case of a patent
troll), it would follow that a patentee may be even more risk averse, since they would
necessarily place a higher relative value on the patent.
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asserting the patent against the other four infringers.138 At the same
time, each infringer merely bears the risk of losing only their own
share of the total royalties that the patentee is able to extract.1 39 In this
situation, the patentee will have a much greater incentive to win the
litigation; 40 at the same time, the patentee also has much more to
lose. This can be expressed as:
Lp= M
Li=M* Si
Where Lp is the value of losing to the patentee, M is the total
value of the market, Si is the percentage market share of the accused
infringer, and Li is value of losing to the accused infringer. If this
understanding is correct, Lp should be greater than Li in all situations
other than one where the infringer holds a monopoly. Professors
Farrell and Merges use this difference in incentives to argue that a
patentee will be more likely to win a lawsuit because of its greater
incentive.n 1 Thus, while the patentee has a greater incentive to win, it
correspondingly has a greater incentive to avoid litigation, or to settle
the litigation if it has been initiated. While the accused infringer
cannot directly access the full value of the patent by winning, instead
being limited only to Mp * Si, they can indirectly access that value via
the threat of winning. In other words, by initiating litigation, the
patentee now has a greatly increased incentive to settle, because their
potential loss is far greater than that of the accused infringer.
Despite the possibility of losing the patent, however, there is no
reason why a patentee will necessarily have a greater incentive to win
a given litigation than the accused infringer. The values each places
on a successful outcome of the litigation are independent of one
another. There are a number of reasons why the value placed by the
patentee is not equal to the full value of all royalties that can be
extracted based on that patent.
First, one cannot assume that the value of the patent to the
patentee is equal to the total market share that it covers. Rarely is
there a situation where a patentee has a single patent in a given
market. Rather, a patentee will typically have a plethora of patents,
138. Professors Farrell and Merges give the example of five infringers of equal size. Each
will gain only a fifth of the gains from a successful challenge, because each is paying only a
fifth of the patentee's total royalties. They conclude that a patentee will thus have five times




141. Id. at 956.
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meaning that the value of a single patent may be quantified as M/np,
where n is the total number of patents relevant to that market held by
the patentee. Given that both np and Si can be variable, it is likely that
there may be situations where M*Si > M/np. In other words, an
individual patent may be worth less to the patentee than the accused
infringer's market value. In such a situation, the accused infringer
would have a lower potential loss from losing than the patentee.
Moreover, perfect knowledge of valuation on the part of the
patentee and the accused infringer is rarely available to the parties.
For instance, a patentee may think that their patent is worth more, or
less, than it really is, while the accused infringer may overvalue or
undervalue their own market share. 142 In such a situation, it would be
possible for the patentee to undervalue its own patent, thus causing
shifts in the incentive structure.
The future value of the patent must also be reduced by the
possibility that a future infringer will challenge the patent and prevail.
Indeed, as more and more infringers challenge the patent, the
probability that the patent will ultimately be invalidated will rise. If a
patentee engages in litigation against a single infringer, its probability
of winning is p, where p is a value between 0 and 1. If the patentee is
forced to litigate against two infringers in separate litigations, the
probability that the patentee will lose becomes p * p. As the patentee
litigates against more and more infringers, its probability of winning
drops substantially. Thus, the total profit of a patentee must be
discounted by the probability of each infringer litigating the patent
versus the probability of winning each suit. This can substantially
lower the value of the patent to the patentee.
Because an infringer can threaten the patent troll's core asset
through litigation, the patentee may have a strong disincentive to
litigate. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that a
patent holder will have a greater incentive to win the litigation than
the accused infringer. Nevertheless, by litigating an infringer can
attempt to tap into the value of the patent, potentially driving the
patentee to settle for a negligible amount.
142. For a discussion of the difficulties in valuing patents, see, e.g., Long, supra note 87,
at 659-68.
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V. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR EVALUATING LITIGATION
INCENTIVES
As the discussion in section III demonstrates, there are factors
that may encourage litigation on the part of the infringer, and
discourage it on the part of the patentee. One way to explore the
effects of these factors is to utilize a settlement model. Such models
have been widely accepted, both in the context of patent law as well
as more generally. 143 While the model presented below is based on the
classic settlement model, it contains a few differences that are
particularly important in the context of patent law. First, it takes into
account not just the award to the patentee of winning the litigation,
but also the cost to the patentee of losing the litigation (particularly,
the loss of the patent). In addition, as discussed in section V.B, this
model incorporates an additional component: the cost to both the
patentee and the infringer of choosing not to litigate. Using this
model, I demonstrate that the factors discussed above will have one of
two effects: a lowering of the settlement price or an increased
likelihood that the infringer will choose to litigate, rather than settle.
A. The Basic Model
When the possibility of litigation or negotiation between two
parties arises, the principle question is what is the value placed by
both parties on the litigation. 144 In other words, how much will the
first party (in this case, the patentee) take to not litigate, and how
much will the second party (in this case, the infringer) be willing to
pay to not have to litigate. 145 These two values define a settlement
range - in other words, a range of values between which a settlement
will occur. 146 If the amount that the patentee is willing to take is less
than the amount that the infringer is willing to pay, the parties should
be able to come to an arrangement so as to avoid litigation.
On the other hand, if the amount that the patentee is willing to
take is greater than the amount that the infringer is willing to pay, the
parties will be unable to settle, and litigation will ensue. While a
143. See, e.g. Farrell and Merges, supra note 3, at 955-60; see also George L. Priest and
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1984);
Samuel Issacharof, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1265, 1268-69 (2002); Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and
Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & Econ. 451, 454-57 (1998).
144. See generally Priest and Klein, supra note 143, at 12.
145. See Issacharoff, supra note 143, at 1268-69.
146. Id.
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situation in which the "true" value of the patentee is higher than that
of the infringer is probably not realistic, 47  the asymmetric
information and divergent expectations theories hold that parties will
frequently mis-estimate the true valuation of their position. 48 For
instance, if both parties over estimate the value of their positions, the
result may be litigation. The narrower the settlement range (i.e.: the
closer the patentee and infringer's settlement points), the more likely
litigation is to arise due to incorrect valuation.
We can determine the extent of the settlement range by
examining the conditions that establish each party's expected value
("EV"). The basic equation to describe each party's expected value is:
EV = (p * W) - ((l-p) * L) - C
where W is the benefit of winning, C is the cost of litigating, and L is
the penalty of losing. 49 The "p" variable represents the probability of
winning (and correspondingly, 1-p represents the probability of
losing). From the point of view of the patentee, if the amount offered
by the infringer is greater than the expected value, the patentee will be
willing to settle; if the amount offered is less than the expected value,
the patentee would rather litigate, as it can obtain a greater value from
litigating than from settling.
147. Standard settlement models do not seriously consider the possibility that the Expected
Value of the plaintiff will be greater than that of the defendant; indeed, for such a situation to
occur, both parties would need to see a significant benefit from winning that outweighed both
parties' loss from losing. However, as discussed above, it is not necessary that the parties'
Expected Valuations cross for litigation to occur, since parties frequently mis-value their own
positions. See Priest and Klein, supra note 143, at 13-14.
148. Under the asymmetric information theory, one party knows the probability that the
other will win (p), while the other has more limited knowledge. Under the divergent
expectations theory, both parties mis-estimate their position. Both situations can lead to
litigation even if the true valuation of the parties' position allows for the existence of a
settlement range. For further discussion of these two theories, see Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling
Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON.
451, 451-52 (1998).
149. This model differs from a classic settlement model (which is simply EV = p * W -
C), see Issacharoff, supra note 143, at 1268, in that it incorporates the possibility that the
plaintiff might see a loss from losing that is independent of their inability to claim the reward. In
many areas of litigation a loss factor may be not have a major impact on the Expected Value, as
the plaintiff has already suffered the loss, and no further loss is likely to arise from litigating.
For instance, in a tort suit, the plaintiff has already suffered the harm, and seeks compensation; a
further loss from litigating would not be expected. In the patent context, however, there is a very
real possibility that the patentee could lose its patent, and all future revenue that could have been
derived from it, if it loses on invalidity grounds. Similarly, as discussed in section IV.A.4, an
infringer may actually gain a positive benefit if it wins the litigation, thus providing a "win"
component to the defendant-equation.
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Because there are two parties, the patentee and the infringer,
each with their own Expected Values, we have two separate
equations:
EVp = (p * Wp) - ((l-p) * Lp) - Cp
EVj = (p * Li) - ((l-p) * Wi) + Ci
where EVp represents the patentee and EVi represents the infringer.
The equation for the patentee is the amount the patentee is willing to
accept to not litigate; the equation for the infringer is the amount that
the infringer is willing to pay to avoid litigation.
For the patentee, the Wp is the value of winning the litigation.'
50
This is essentially the value it can force the infringer to pay by
enforcing its patent. In some cases, this may be the damages it
obtains; in others, the amount it can extract if it obtains an
injunction. 15 Presumably, Wp will equal approximately Li, or the
amount of the penalty to the infringer if it loses the litigation.
Cp represents the costs to the patentee of litigating. These costs
can take a variety of forms - attorney's fees, court charges, etc. Lp is
the penalty the patentee must pay if it loses. While the patentee does
not have to pay damages if it loses, except in extraordinary
circumstances, 152 if the patentee loses, it will suffer future damages -
for instance, if the infringer is found not to infringe, future infringers
that the patentee may attempt to assert the patent against may be
similarly situated. Worse, if the infringer succeeds in having the
patent declared invalid, the patentee will lose all future value that it
could extract from future infringers, either via litigation or non-
litigation licenses of the patent. Thus, for the patentee, Lp refers to the
future cost of losing the litigation.
Based upon this background, we now have the following
equation for the Expected Value of the patentee:
EVp = (p * Wp) - ((l-p) * Lp) - Cp
From this equation, we can deduce several things. First, the
higher the benefit of winning, the higher the patentee's expected
value. Similarly, the greater the cost of losing, the lower the expected
150. Keep in mind that the discussion is limited to patent trolls. The only benefit that a
patent troll derives from a patent is the value that it can extract from infringers based on that
patent. Thus, outside of the value that it can extra by licensing the patent (settling) or enforcing
the patent (litigating), it gains nothing else from the patent. Moreover, it gains no ancillary
benefits (such as protecting its own market share or product line) from enforcing the patent -
only the value that it can actually extract from the infringer.
151. The ability of a patent troll to obtain an injunction has been heavily hampered by the
recent eBay decision, as discussed below in section VI.
152. Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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value will be. 53 If the cost of the litigation plus the penalty for losing
is high enough, the expected value will be less than zero. Of course, a
patentee would presumably be willing to simply avoid litigation
altogether, rather than litigate and lose more than it could possibly
win, so we can conclude that a patentee will avoid litigation when 0 >
(p * Wp) - ((l-p) * Lp)- Cp-154
The analysis for the infringer is different, because we are not
determining how much value the infringer seeks to extract, but rather
how much value it is willing to pay in order to avoid litigation. In
order for the infringer to pay the patentee, litigating must not be a
better option than settling. The equation for the infringer is as follows:
EVi = (p * Li) - ((l-p) * Wi) + Ci
For the infringer, Wi is the benefit of winning. Unlike the
patentee, the infringer obtains no direct benefit from winning.
However, as discussed above in section IV.D, the infringer may
derive some indirect benefit from winning the litigation. Li is the
penalty for losing the litigation. Unlike the patentee, the only penalty
the infringer pays is the value that can be extracted by the patentee.
Based on this analysis, the infringer should license when the amount
demanded by the patentee is less than ((p * Li) - ((l-p) * Wi) + Ci,
and should litigate when the amount demanded by the patentee is
more than (p * Li) - ((l-p) * W1) + Ci. In other words, the cost of
paying for a license must be less than the cost of litigation and the
penalty for losing minus the benefit from winning the litigation. 55
Given that the benefit from winning is likely to be fairly small
153. We can assess the effects of probability to some extent. Take, for example, the perfect
case. If the patentee has a 100% chance of winning (p(winning) = 1), the analysis is simply EVP
= Wp - C,. If the cost to litigate is 2, the benefit to winning is 10, and the penalty for losing is
100, Sp = 10 when the patentee has a perfect chance of winning (EVp = Wp(10) -
(Cp(2)*p(winning)(1) + Lp(l00)*(l-p(winning)(l))). Moreover, we can conclude from the
perfect situation that, if the benefits for winning are less than the cost of litigating, there would
appear to be no reason to litigate.
154. Some scholars have argued that a plaintiff may be able to extract a settlement price
even if its expected value is below zero. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning
the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23-24 (1996). However,
when a patent troll's expected value is negative due to a large potential loss component, such a
strategy would be very risky.
155. As with the analysis for the patentee, probability of winning can play a role in the
settlement value. If the patentee is extremely likely to win the litigation, the settlement value
will be driven down, and the infringer will not be willing to settle, even for a value less than the
costs of the litigation. On the other hand, if the infringer is not likely to win, they should be
willing to settle for more than the costs of litigation. We can also say that increasing the value of
winning to the infringer will drive the settlement value up, while increasing the cost of losing
will drive it down.
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compared to the cost of losing, an infringer is likely to be willing to
pay some positive amount to avoid litigation.
These equations provide us with important information about the
patentee and infringer's expected behavior. One such piece of
information is the effect of the patentee's potential loss from losing
the litigation. The greater the potential loss, the lower the patentee's
expected value will go. At the same time, the possibility of a high loss
on the part of the patent troll has no effect on the infringer's expected
value. Thus, the net effect of the patentee loss component is as
follows: the greater the potential loss to the patentee, the wider the
settlement range will be, and the more likely the parties will be to
settle. However, because this expansion is due. to a lower expected
value on the part of the patentee, while the infringer's expected value
remains unchanged, the effect will drive the settlement price down.
This can be seen by looking at how one factor that can affect the
degree of loss, the infringer's size, plays into this analysis. In the case
of litigating against an infringer with a small market share, the cost of
losing for the patentee will be much greater than the benefit of
winning. 156 This is because, by winning, the patentee will only be able
to extract a small fraction of the total value of the patent, while by
losing, the patentee loses the total value of the patent. In terms of our
variables, WP < Lp. This situation can also be described as one where
the patentee has a low benefit to winning at a high cost of losing. 157 In
such a situation, the patentee has a very low Expected Value (possibly
below zero), because the cost of litigating will substantially exceed
the benefit of winning. This suggests that there is an economic force
countering the increased likelihood of success that a large patentee
may have when litigating against a small infringer.
158
156. See Farrell and Merges, supra note 3, at 951. Note that if the patentee has multiple
patents covering the relevant market, the loss of a single patent may not be a significant loss. See
discussion supra section IV.D.
157. Returning to our probabilistic analysis, in such a situation, any uncertainty in the
ability of a patentee to win will drive the patentee's settlement value significantly down, because
the cost of losing will rapidly escalate. Continuing the previous example, if the patentee's
probability of winning decreases by merely 0.1, the patentee will go from a settlement point of 8
(EVi = Wp(l 0) * p(winning)(1) - (Ci(2) + Li(100) * (1 -p(winning)(1))) to a settlement point of -
3 (EV = Wp(l 0) * p(winning)(. 1) - (Ci(2) + Lj(100) * (1-p(winning)(.9))).
158. In situations where there is a large potential loss from losing, the patent holder will
presumably spend more money on the litigation, thus resulting in a greater probability of
winning. See Farrell and Merges, supra note 3, at 948-49. The above analysis suggests that,
while a large patentee may experience greater success against a small infringer, that success is
counterbalanced by the higher risk/reward ratio.
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On the other hand, in the case of litigating against an infringer
with a relatively large market share, Wp will be much higher relative
to Lp (i.e. the cost of losing to the patentee will be approximately
equal to the value of winning that particular litigation, since most of
the value of the patent lies in the present, rather than the future).
Compared to the previous situation, which involved an infringer with
a small market share, the patentee will have a higher Expected
Value. 59
Using this model, we can see how the other factors discussed in
section IV affect the settlement range, thus driving down the
likelihood and amount of a settlement. First, any of the factors that
make it more likely that the infringer will win, such as tactical
benefits, will drive the settlement range as a whole down and make it
more likely that the patentee will be willing to settle. As p moves
toward 0, the gain to the patentee of winning goes down, and the
potential loss rises quickly. At the same time, the infringer's potential
loss goes down, and the potential gain from winning goes up. The net
effect of this movement is to drive the patent troll's expected value
down faster than that of the infringer. If the patent troll's expected
value hits zero, it would presumably simply avoid litigation
altogether.
Similarly, the ability to "fix" the claim scope through litigation
may also drive down the settlement range, by lowering both the patent
troll and the infringer's expected values. Under the "fixed claims"
scenario, even if the patentee wins, the claim scope will be locked
into place, potentially allowing the infringer an opportunity to design
around the patent. As a result, the cost of a loss to the infringer will
go down, as will the benefit of a win for the patentee. The net effect
of this will be to drive down the Expected Valuations for both the
infringer and the patentee, thus lowering the settlement range as a
whole.
At the same time, other benefits of winning may increase the
likelihood of litigation. One such factor is the external benefit that the
infringer derives from winning the litigation. For instance, if the
infringer is found not to infringe, but the patent is determined to be
valid, the infringer will obtain freedom to operate despite the
159. Moreover, the higher Wp is relative to Lp, the more elasticity there is in the
probability of winning. For instance, if p(winning) = 0.9 instead of 1.0, and Wp = 55, while Lp =
55 (i.e.: the patentee can extract 50% of the total value of the patent from the patentee if it wins
the litigation, but the future loss will be the remaining 50% of the value if it loses), EV = 42
(Wp(55) * p(winning)(0.9) - (Cp(2) + L(55)*(l-p(winning)(0.9)).
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existence of a patent; at the same time, its competitors will remain in
the status quo situation, where they could be threatened with the
patent.160 While this factor will drive Wi up, it will not affect Lp.
Correspondingly, the settlement range will become narrower, and the
tendency of the parties to litigate will increase.
Changes in litigation costs will also affect the amount and
likelihood of settlement. The lower the cost to the infringer of
litigating, the higher the infringer's expected value will be (i.e.: the
less it will be willing to pay to avoid litigation). Because a higher
infringer expected value will result in a narrower settlement range,
this will make litigation more likely. On the other hand, if the
patentee's litigation costs are likely to be high, its expected value will
go down, making litigation more likely. In both cases, however, the
net effect will be to push the final settlement amount down, by
depressing either the top end (infringer's value) or the bottom end
(patentee's value) of the range.
As this analysis demonstrates, the incentives for litigating are
asymmetric between the infringer and the patentee. Both parties must
necessarily take into account both the fixed costs incurred by
litigating as well as the probability of a favorable (or unfavorable)
outcome. The patentee's decision rests heavily on the relationship
between the present value of winning the litigation compared to the
future value of the patent (i.e.: the loss incurred by losing the
litigation), while the infringer's decision is primarily driven by the
potential loss it would incur if it loses the litigation.
B. The Cost of Not Litigating
To this point, the discussion of Expected Values has not taken
into account the cost of not litigating. Such a cost is one paid by both
the patentee and the infringer. For the patentee, if it chooses not to
litigate, it reduces the future value of its patent. This is because the
future value is dependant in large part on the ability of the patentee to
threaten to enforce its patent. If the patentee chooses not to enforce its
patent in a given situation, it lessens the threat posed by that patent to
other parties. (Think of the boy who cried wolf). Similarly, if the
infringer pays up, they are inviting future patentees to threaten them,
also hoping for a payoff merely by asserting their patent. As discussed
above, it is rarely more advantageous for a patent troll to litigate if it
160. See discussion supra section IV.A.4.
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can instead license, and patent trolls will flock to infringers who
freely pay out.
So the relationship for the patentee becomes:
EV = (Wp + Np) - (Cp + Lp)
where Np is the cost of not litigating. Thus, when the benefit of
winning plus the cost of not litigating is greater than the cost of the
litigation plus the potential loss from litigating, the patentee's
Expected Value will be high.
The same size conclusion holds true for this analysis as it did for
the earlier one. For instance, we know that if Lp is small relative to
Wp, Np will also be small relative to Wp. Thus, the patentee will want
to litigate if Wp > Cp. On the other hand, if Lp is large relative to Wp,
Np could be either small or large relative to Wp. If Np is large relative
to Wp, a patentee will still high settlement point, because they will be
willing to litigate even if the potential loss is high. On the other hand,
if Np is small relative to Wp, the settlement point will be low, because
a patentee will want to avoid litigation even if it means incurring a
small loss in the future value of the patent.
The cost of not litigating also has a similar effect on the analysis
with respect to infringers. Rather than
EVi = Ci + (Li - Wi)
the equation should instead be written as:
EVi = (Ci + Li) - (Wi + Ni)
Unlike for the patentee, Ni is completely unrelated to Li, since Li
is the present cost of losing to the infringer (unlike for the patentee,
where it represents the future cost of losing). However, as with the
analysis for the patentee, Ni has a reputational component - in other
words, it depends on how future patent trolls will perceive the effect
of the infringer having settled.
As for the patentee's future costs of not litigating, we can deduce
some information about Ni. In particular, we can conclude that Ni will
depend in part on the cost to future patentees to threaten litigation
against the infringer. The lower the costs future patentees can expect
to pay, the more likely they will be to threaten enforcement litigation.
Based on the equation above for optimal settlement point for the
patentee, we know that if the costs of litigating go up, the optimal
settlement point for a patentee will go down. Thus, by litigating, an
infringer generates a reputation that it is willing to force future
patentees to incur those costs. By not litigating, an infringer suggests
to future patentees that their Cp will be low, thus encouraging them to
threaten (or driving up their settlement price). In addition, the
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infringer also indicates to future patentees that their patents will not
be at risk if they assert a patent threat, thus raising Lp.1
61
So what have we learned? We've learned that the likelihood and
amount of settlement depends not just on the potential award for the
patentee and the potential loss to the infringer, but also on the
potential loss to the patentee and the potential award for the infringer.
For instance, a patentee will favor litigation when the infringer has a
relatively large share of the market. On the other hand, a patentee will
disfavor litigation when the infringer holds only a relatively small
share of the market, because the cost of losing is very high relative to
the present value of winning.
At the same time, the future cost of not litigating can also have
an impact. For the patentee, if the cost of losing is relatively small
compared to the cost of winning, the patentee will still favor litigation
over avoiding litigation entirely. However, if the cost of losing is high
compared to the cost of winning, whether the patentee favors
litigating over doing nothing depends on whether the future cost of
not litigating is low or high compared to the loss from losing. If it is
high, then the patentee may still favor litigating, but if it is low, the
patentee would be better served by doing nothing.
With regard to the infringer, the incentives are somewhat
different. While it initially appeared that the settlement point was
dependant only on the relationship between the patentee's settlement
offer and the infringer's costs of litigating, benefits from winning and
present cost of losing, a more nuanced analysis revealed that the
future cost of not litigating can also play a major role. A high Ni can
drive the infringer to litigate, even if the situation would otherwise
suggest a high settlement point for the infringer.
Finally, we can conclude that litigation will occur if EVi < EVp,
while the infringer will pay a license to the patentee if 0 < EVp <EVi.
The patentee should leave the infringer alone if EVp < 0, because if
the patentee litigates, they stand to lose more than they could possibly
gain. This can be illustrated as follows:
161. Note that an infringer gains no additional value by licensing a patent in the present,
and then litigating a patent in the future. While it may have incentives to do so that are
independent of its prior choices (such as a low cost of losing in situation I versus a high cost of
losing in situation 2), those incentives do not suggest a reason to hide its future plans to litigate
by licensing in situation 1.
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Settlement 0 EVp - (- EVi
Litigation 0 (-- EV EVp --
Patentee Avoids EVp- 0
Litigation
As the above diagrams demonstrate, when the settlement point of
the infringer is higher than that of the patentee, the infringer will
settle. On the other hand, when the settlement point of the infringer is
lower than that of the patentee, the infringer will litigate.
C. The Settlement Point Model and the Declaratory Judgment
Act
What if, however, the settlement points for both the patentee and
the infringer are below zero? Such a circumstance is illustrated below:
<-- EVi EVp -- 0
In such a situation, it would not make sense for the patentee to
initiate litigation. But what if the infringer chooses to initiate
litigation under a mechanism such as the Declaratory Judgment Act?
The most direct mechanism by which a threatened firm can
initiate patent litigation is to file a suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that its product does not infringe any valid claims of a given patent.
These types of actions offer an accused infringer an opportunity to
remove the uncertainty caused by a patent threat. In the patent
context, actions for a declaratory judgment are based on the general
authorizing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). Thus, the standard
requirement for a declaratory judgment action - an actual controversy
between interested parties - also applies to suits involving patent
questions. 162 However, while there is no special jurisdictional statute
for patent declaratory judgment actions, particular rules have been
developed about how the "actual case or controversy" element can be
met when an infringer brings an action against a patent holder.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action only if an
162. B.P. Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("A
declaratory judgment action may be brought in order to resolve an 'actual controversy' between
'interested' parties") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201).
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"actual case or controversy" exists between the parties. 63 As courts
have routinely recognized, the declaratory judgment act is not
intended to permit advisory opinions on a situation not ripe for
litigation. 164 The requirement that a controversy be actual, as opposed
to hypothetical, is met if there is a real and substantial dispute
between the parties that affects their legal rights and obligations.
165
This ensures that federal courts are litigating real disputes that require
judicial resolution.
In the patent context, there are two elements that must be met
when evaluating whether an actual controversy exists: a reasonable
apprehension and infringing conduct. 166 The burden of establishing
the existence of that controversy rests on the party bringing the
action. 167 Because the burden of establishing these factors rests on the
party bringing the suit, it can be difficult for a threatened infringer to
challenge a patent. Moreover, even if the plaintiff can demonstrate the
existence of a case or controversy, the court has discretion to decline
that jurisdiction. 168
Thus, once a threatened infringer files a suit seeking declaratory
relief, it must demonstrate that its case satisfies these two elements.
First, the patentee's conduct must have created on the part of the
infringer a reasonable apprehension that the patentee will initiate suit
if the infringer continues the allegedly infringing activity.' 69 This
prong looks to the patentee's conduct, and requires an objective
(rather than subjective) apprehension of suit.' 70 Second, the infringer
must actually have either engaged in, or be imminently prepared to
engage in, the allegedly infringing conduct. 171 This analysis is based
on the plaintiffs conduct.
172
163. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) ("In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction...
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.").
164. B.P. Chemicals, 4 F.3d at 977; see also Coffinan v. Breeze Corps., Inc, 323 U.S. 316,
324 (1945) (stating that declaratory judgment actions "may not be made the medium for
securing an advisory opinion in a controversy which has not arisen.").
165. B.P. Chemicals, 4 F.3d at 977.
166. See, e.g., Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
167. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
168. Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
169. See B.P. Chemicals, 4 F.3d at 978.
170. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
171. See B.P. Chemicals, 4 F.3d at 978.
172. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
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When the patentee is a patent troll, the second prong is likely to
be met fairly readily; patent trolls are primarily interested in obtaining
revenues from firms that have an established market presence, rather
than those that are hoping or seeking to enter the market.173 Thus, in
most cases involving a patent troll, the plaintiff will already be
engaging in the necessary conduct - selling an allegedly infringing
product, for example, or using a potentially infringing method. Given
that the second prong is likely to be met in such a situation, the
primary issue when bringing a declaratory judgment action against a
patent troll is whether the patentee's conduct has created a reasonable
apprehension of suit.
This inquiry is highly fact-dependant, and oftentimes turns on
the specific circumstances in a given situation.1 74 A few general rules
exist, however. First, a patent threat of some sort must exist. This
necessarily requires the existence of a patent 17 and a threat based on
that patent. 176 The threat may be an explicit statement of intent to
enforce a patent, but it need not be.177 In the latter case, the totality of
the circumstances is analyzed to determine whether a reasonable
apprehension exists.' 78 The mere existence of a patent, without more,
is not enough to create a reasonable apprehension.179
Complicating the inquiry are the Federal Circuit's views on the
apprehension requirement as it relates to licensing negotiations. As a
general matter, licensing negotiations do not, in and of themselves,
constitute a basis for "reasonable apprehension," nor as a general
matter do statements made during those negotiations. 180 Oftentimes,
posturing on the part of the patentee during such negotiations is not
viewed as an explicit threat of suit.' 8' For instance, simply asserting
173. As discussed in section III, patent trolls are generally interested in obtaining revenue
by enforcing their patents - not in transferring new technology that has value independent of the
patent rights.
174. B.P. Chemicals, 4 F.3d at 980 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("There is not always an easy
demarcation between a reasonable apprehension on the part of a would-be infringer, and the
situation whereby a patent, by its existence, inhibits unauthorized practice of its subject matter.
The relationships are rarely as simple as they appear in judicial opinions.").
175. GAF Building Mat. Corp. v. Elk Corp. of Dallas, 90 F.3d 479, 482 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
176. Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt Inc., 148 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
177. See, e.g., Arrowhead Indus. 846 F.2d at 736.
178. Id.
179. See id
180. Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888; Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha,
57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
181. See West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Res., Inc., 972 F.2d 1295, 1297-98 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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that an infringer's activities "fall within" the claims of a patent does
not constitute an express charge of infringement. 82 Such statements,
or "jawboning," during negotiations do not create a reasonable
apprehension. 8 3 Moreover, most patentees are sophisticated entities
who are aware of the Declaratory Judgment Act; thus, they often use
language that is intended to avoid creating a reasonable
apprehension. 184 This practice is recognized, however, and courts
impose no requirement that certain "magic words" be used for a
reasonable apprehension to exist. Thus the inquiry turns on the
substance of the relationship between the parties. 185 In the event that
negotiations break down, a declaratory judgment action can be filed.
However, while courts generally follow the "first to file" rule with
respect to an earlier filed declaratory judgment action (assuming a
controversy exists) and a later filed infringement action, in post-
negotiation situations, the declaratory judgment case may be
transferred to the jurisdiction where the infringement action is
pending. 1
86
When, as in most cases, there is no explicit threat, courts must
determine whether the totality of circumstances demonstrates the
existence of a reasonable apprehension. 187 Here, the focus is on the
behavior of the patentee, both towards the infringer as well as third
parties. For instance, demonstrating a willingness to enforce the
patent may favor the finding of a reasonable apprehension. 188 A
patentee is not required to stand still while the patentee chooses its
victims, picking them off one by one at its leisure.189 Whether patent
182. Shell Oil, 970 F.2d at 888.
183. Id. at 889.
184. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
185. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (stating that, in the absence of an express charge, the
court "must consider the 'totality of the circumstances' in determining whether that conduct"
created a reasonable apprehension that the patentee will initiate suit.).
186. Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1993), overruled
on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S 277, 289 (1995); Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D. Mass 2002); Kleinerman v.
Luxtron Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 122, 124-25 (D. Mass 2000). Compare Holmes Group, 249 F.
Supp. 2d at 16 (acknowledging Kleinerman as stating the applicable rule for patent cases, but
finding that the rule is not applicable where the accused infringer, rather than engaging in
licensing discussions with patentee, merely denied liability and immediately filed declaratory
relief action.); see also EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 814; but see Russell Corp. v. Sara Lee Corp., 129
F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (N.D. 111. 2001).
187. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 737-38 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
188. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955-56 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
189. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 738. In Arrowhead, the Federal Circuit described the
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trolls are targeting the market as a whole, or are instead focusing on a
single infringer, the core concept is the same: it is the threat of
enforcement action that motivates the infringer to act. Such a situation
may push the court closer to finding that jurisdiction exists in a
declaratory judgment action. 90
When the requirements for a declaratory judgment action are
met, an infringer may affirmatively choose to initiate litigation against
a patent troll if it finds itself in a situation where both it and the
patentee's settlement points are below zero. By litigating against the
troll in this situation, the infringer forces the patentee to take some
action to affirmatively remove the threat of suit - provide a covenant
not to sue, for example. This eliminates the uncertainty for the
infringer that would have existed if it had simply remained in the
market.' 9'
As discussed above, litigation need not be something that a
threatened infringer is forced into by a patentee. Instead, it can be a
highly effective weapon against a patent troll. By litigating, an
accused infringer can preclude the patentee from capturing not just
the value attributable to the accused infringer, but also the value that
the patent holder might be able to obtain from other potential
infringers. This is because patent litigation is not one sided - both
parties have the potential to lose value. By threatening the value that
the patentee can extract from third parties by putting the validity of a
patent in play, a threatened infringer may be able to force the patent
holder to settle for a minimal amount.
Declaratory Judgment Act as enabling a test of the validity and infringement of patents that are
being used merely as "scarecrows" and "extra-judicial patent enforcement," where "a patent
owner engages in a danse macabre, brandishing a Democlean threat with a sheathed sword."
Arrowhead Indus, 846 F.2d at 734-35 & n.4.
190. It should also be recognized that an infringer may be able to achieve its end goal -
forcing litigation - by filing a declaratory judgment action even if the action is ultimately
transferred or dismissed. Filing an action now forces the patentee to make a choice - engage in
litigation or remove the threat of its patent.
191. The possibilities for proactive infringer initiated litigation can be expanded if a more
liberal reading of the requirements for declaratory judgment, such as that proposed by professor
Dolak, were adopted. Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases:
Restoring the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903,
944-48 (1997). Under such circumstances, infringers would be further encouraged to bring suit
against patentees with a low settlement point so as to force the patentee to provide the infringer
with some sort of assurance that eliminated the patent threat.
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VI. EBA Y AND THE WEAKENING OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
One of the patent troll's most potent weapons for the past decade
has been its ability to raise the potential litigation loss to the infringer
through the threat of an injunction. The benefit of this to the patentee
is that it raises the infringer's settlement point - in other words, the
infringer will be willing to pay even more to remove the patent threat.
The recent Supreme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange
drastically reduced the ability of a patent troll to obtain a permanent
injunction against an infringer. In terms of the model discussed in
section V, this will necessarily drive down Li, the potential cost to the
infringer of losing. This produces two effects. First, it lowers both the
patentee and infringer's settlement points, resulting in lower (but not
necessarily less frequent) licenses. Second, it has the potential to drive
the patent troll's settlement point below zero, reducing the economic
viability of litigation.
MercExchange is an invention holding company that holds
several patents on e-commerce technology.' 92 It sued eBay, a leading
online auction site, for infringing its patents with its "Buy It Now"
feature, which allows for instantaneous sales of product between
buyer and seller (thus bypassing the remainder of the auction
period). 193 A jury found that two of the patents were valid and
infringed, and the district court entered an award of damages. 194 The
district court, however, refused to impose a permanent injunction,
concluding that based on the four-factor equitable test set forth in
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo'95 a permanent injunction would be
inappropriate in this case.
196
On appeal, Judge Bryson, writing for the panel, reversed the
district court's refusal to enter an injunction. In the opinion, Judge
Bryson noted that "[b]ecause the 'right to exclude recognized in a
patent is but the essence of the concept of property,' the general rule
is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and
validity have been adjudged," 197 outside of such exceptional
circumstances as "to protect public health."' 98 Since there was no
192. See High Court Directs Lower Courts to Apply 4-Part Equitable Test for Issuing
Injunctions, 72 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., (BNA) 1770 at 50 (May 19, 2006).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
196. See MercExchange, L.L.C., v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
197. See MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd.,
868 F.2d 1266, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
198. Id.
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evidence that this was an "exceptional case," the Federal Circuit's
own precedent dictated that a permanent injunction was necessary. 99
EBay petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on this
issue, which the Court granted.200
In a major shift in patent law, a unanimous Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit's holding that a permanent injunction
must issue in this case. In doing so, the Court specifically rejected the
position that "an injunction should be denied only in the 'unusual'
case, under 'exceptional circumstances' and in 'rare instances.. .to
protect the public interest.' 20 1 Rather, it was instead necessary to
consider the four traditional equitable factors, and apply them to each
specific matter before the court.
202
While the Court steered away from stating any rules of general
applicability, including as they related to the ability of patent trolls to
obtain injunctive relief, four justices joined together to pointedly
condemn patent troll-like behavior. Writing for these justices, Justice
Kennedy described an industry that had arisen, "in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods, but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees. 20 3 These firms could use the
threat of an injunction to obtain "exorbitant fees" from companies that
sought to practice their patents.20 4 In such a context, Kennedy wrote,
"legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest. 20 5
Thus, while the Court in eBay did not outright forbid the issuance of
injunctions when the patentee was a patent troll, it strongly hinted that
injunctions in such cases would be highly disfavored.
The ripples from eBay are still being felt, and it will be years
before the effects are fully sorted out.20 6 However, it is clear that the
199. Seeid. at 1339.
200. Mark Vorder-Bruegge Jr., Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement - A New Era?,
53-JUL Fed. Law. 14, 14 (July 2006).
201. See MercExchange, 126 S.Ct. at 1841.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. For instance, district courts are now grappling with the issue of whether there is still a
presumption of irreparable harm once infringement and validity have been found. Compare z4
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006) with
Christiana Inds. Inc. v. Empire Electronics, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54210, at *5 (E. D.
Mich. 2006) (holding that the presumption continues to exist, at least in the context of
preliminary injunctions). For another discussion of the effects of eBay, see Mark Vorder-
Bruegge Jr., Injunctive Relieffor Patent Infringement -A New Era?, 53-JUL Fed. Law. 14, 14
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general rule that an injunction will almost invariably issue on a
finding of infringement and validity no longer exists. It is also clear
that the ability of a patentee to obtain a permanent injunction -
especially when that patentee is a troll - has been substantially
lessened.
Regardless of eBay's other effects, it will necessarily limit the
ability of patent trolls to obtain injunctions, thus driving down the
amount they can demand for a license in lieu of litigation. In terms of
the model presented in this paper, this will drive down the potential
litigation loss for the infringer (Li). As Li drops, the amount the
infringer would be willing to pay to avoid litigation will also drop -
thus increasing the infringer's willingness to litigate in the face of a
patent threat. At the same time, the value of victory for the patentee
(Wp) will also drop, since even if there is a finding of both
infringement and validity, it will be unlikely to obtain an injunction.
As Wp drops, the amount that the patentee is willing to accept to
license the patent will fall, although not necessarily at the same rate as
the infringer's settlement point. This leads to two conclusions. First,
because the settlement points for both the infringer and the patentee
will drop as a result of eBay, there will not necessarily be change in
the frequency of litigation. The amount infringers will be willing to
pay will be smaller, which suggests that they would be more willing
to litigate. However, the license amounts sought by patentees will also
be smaller - thus making them more willing to give out bargain
basement licenses. Consequently, patent troll-infringer litigation is
unlikely to decline.
On the other hand, because the Sp for the patent trolls will drop
as a result of eBay, the model presented herein suggests that there will
be more situations in which the settlement point for the patent troll is
below zero. In such cases, it is not rational for a troll to litigate,
because it stands to lose more from the litigation than it can gain. The
more often Sp falls below zero for a given patent troll, the less often it
will be able to make a viable demand that an infringer license its
patents.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to demonstrate that there are a
number of benefits that an infringer can obtain if it chooses to litigate
against a patent troll. Besides the direct benefits that the infringer can
(July 2006).
2006]
210 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. [Vol. 23
derive from litigating, the infringer may also benefit from the
valuation placed on the litigation result by the patentee, which can
play a key role in determining when litigation will take place. For the
infringer who seeks to litigate, advantageous options such as a
declaratory judgment action may be available. Their use, however,
will necessarily depend on the particular circumstances of the
infringer's position. Given this situation, the infringer's threat of
litigation provides a counterbalancing force to the patent troll's ability
to extract a license, and plays a major role in forcing low price
settlements with patent trolls.
